CVE-2026-93672 · Runtime
NO FIX YET
The Zephyr Bluetooth host dereferences a NULL ATT request pointer when it scans idle channels, reachable from a peer that withholds a subscribe write response and then sends a notification. On targets where near-NULL reads trap, the device faults and resets; on default Cortex-M builds the read is harmless.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 1 source
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Devices running the Zephyr Bluetooth host stack where the peer can send a notification during a pending subscribe. Exposure is a reset, not code execution, and only on targets where near-NULL reads trap (TrustZone non-secure, MMU targets, native_sim, or null-pointer detection enabled). Default Cortex-M builds with the vector table at address 0 and null-pointer detection off are not affected in practice.
Not affected if default-config, non-bluetooth-builds
Who cares bluetooth, embedded, firmware, zephyr
CONFIG_BT) and whether EATT is enabled (CONFIG_BT_EATT)west list zephyr or the VERSION fileUnknown from the sources.
bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.
The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.
The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.
The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.