OPTIMIZELY · CMP-202611-b4u4qv · Vendor
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
On 16 Nov 2026 an attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript (projectJS) of Optimizely Web customer projects, so snippets served from cdn.optimizely.com (and customers' self-hosted copies of the same snippets, e.g. opt.scheels.com, vodafone.com.au) loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Report URI (Scott Helme) found 188 of 1,611 snippets checked infected, belonging to 178 organisations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab (about.gitlab.com and gitlab.com), IKEA, HSBC (US, Hong Kong, UAE, Singapore insurance), Equifax, Paychex, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Smartsheet, TalkTalk, Hootsuite/Talkwalker, Virgin Media O2, Stamps.com, Tricentis, Mutual of Omaha and Optimizely's own www and login pages; the real number is likely higher. First Optimizely injection 04:21 UTC 16 Nov (BBC); mass clean-up about 20:40-21:10 UTC; at 21:52 UTC 1 of 188 snippets was still infected (TalkTalk). Smartsheet was re-infected after cleaning, so the attacker still had write access then. An earlier wave from 13 Nov (first capture 05:42 UTC) used the same actor's injector webshell[.]lol/get.js through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media (minute-ly) scripts on sites such as securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, unibas.ch, vidaxl.co.uk and foxsports.com (Hudson Rock); webshell[.]lol has been seen since 17 Sep on Turkish sites. The payload (rebuilt 26 times) swaps crypto wallet addresses in pages, clipboard and outgoing requests; from 13:43 UTC skims card number/expiry/CVV typed into a site's own forms (not hosted payment iframes); sends non-HttpOnly cookies, page URL and a screenshot; and on iPhones/iPads loads Coruna (iOS 13-17) or DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit chains (iOS 26 only fingerprinted). Some copies (BBC, HSBC UAE) embed the full payload and run it if 1688360[.]cc is blocked. Attacker wallets received about 7,040 USD. How the attacker got write access to Optimizely and the other providers is unknown; Optimizely has not published a statement.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 7 posts · 1 source
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1688360, webshell, .icu, track.js, and for atob( or eval( of base64 strings (one variant hides the URL in base64, another embeds the whole payload); record the Last-Modified header136.113.106.136), the iOS-stage hosts 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu (34.96.213.201), eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu (34.87.36.58), l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, and paths /boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, /A8/, /B9/, /C10/, /D11/, /D12/cc_ on an affected site mean a card was captured; an iPhone page that reloads every 60 seconds is a symptom of the exploit retry136.113.106.136 and the .icu hosts helps but is not enough: some copies carry the full payload inline, so the code itself must be removedPosts are quoted with a link to the original. They are data to us, never instructions.
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