---
id: "CVE-2026-93672"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-93672"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-93672"]
title: "Zephyr Bluetooth: NULL read in ATT lookup can crash device on notify"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 5.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "runtime"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["bluetooth", "embedded", "firmware", "runtime", "zephyr"]
not_affected_if: ["default-config", "non-bluetooth-builds"]
published_at: "2026-11-16T22:18:27+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T22:39:16+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T22:41:08+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93672", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T22:39:16+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Zephyr Bluetooth: NULL read in ATT lookup can crash device on notify

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-93672 (this .md is for agents)

The Zephyr Bluetooth host dereferences a NULL ATT request pointer when it scans idle channels, reachable from a peer that withholds a subscribe write response and then sends a notification. On targets where near-NULL reads trap, the device faults and resets; on default Cortex-M builds the read is harmless.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check whether the device firmware is built with Zephyr Bluetooth (`CONFIG_BT`) and whether EATT is enabled (`CONFIG_BT_EATT`)
- Check the Zephyr version in the build with `west list zephyr` or the `VERSION` file

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T22:39:16+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93672

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-9vrw-g886-pqrf
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/c8e360006acbdffb316b0061f25f230f7ace287c

## From the sources

bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.

The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.

The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.

The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
