USDM-MINTING-CLIENT · MAL-2026-19952 · Package
UNINSTALL IT, ROTATE THE KEYS IT COULD READ
Not triaged yet. The sources’ own description is below.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 1 source
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Unknown from the sources.
Unknown from the sources.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
usdm-minting-client 0.1.1 performs credential theft at both install time and import time. setup.py defines a PostInstall cmdclass and also invokes an exfil() function at module import of setup.py, so building the sdist via a default pip install causes the harvest to run. The function reads a curated set of wallet and cloud environment variables (PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, AWS, GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, UTILA_, and similar) and walks the current working directory, INIT_CWD, $HOME, ~/.utila, and ~/.config for.env,.pem,.key,.json, and.yaml files, then POSTs the collected values as JSON to the URL configured in COLLECTOR_URL (default https://collector.example/collect) via urllib.request.urlopen. The package's top-level init.py repeats the exfiltration on import without any guard other than a ~/.usdm_client_exfil_done marker file: it reads USDM_PRIVATE_KEY, PRIVATE_KEY, MNEMONIC, and USDM_RPC_URL from the environment along with cwd/.env, ~/.env, and ~/.usdm.env, and POSTs them to the same collector. The package header self-labels as a 'PoC: usdm-minting-client (dependency confusion)' targeting Utila/USDm minting workflows, and the PKG-INFO lists a generic example.com homepage with a free-mail author. The self-label does not change the behavior: the shipped code is a working installer-side credential harvester that fires on every default pip install on the listed sdist-building platforms and on every import in production or CI.
During installation the package exfiltrates credential files and environment variables, focusing on cryptocurrency- and cloud-related entries. The package seems to be targeting users of a package from GitHub (https://github.com/ethena-labs/usdm-minting-client) which has not been published to PyPI.
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-11-usdm-minting-client
Reasons (based on the campaign):
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
exfiltration-env-variables
crypto-related
exfiltration-crypto
exfiltration-credentials