Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)

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Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206)

The package exposes a single public function starts() that walks /storage/emulated/0/ (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every .json, .py, .pyrubi, and .txt file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via requests.post to https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument with a hardcoded chat_id of 5263487757. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.

Source: kam193 (ca9520dcc3936b679b577bee42392ecb6ee65cd658c4858d325de5c738a7a200)

The package contains code for automated files exfiltration.

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• files-exfiltration

• target:android