---
id: "MAL-2026-17889"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-17889"]
title: "Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "proxyrobika", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 0.1.0", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-15T20:33:51+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:52:03+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:06:18+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17889", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:52:03+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in proxyrobika (PyPI)

## Affected

- pypi:proxyrobika affected = 0.1.0 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:52:03+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17889

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (5242a5c1d50ffd677c3b9b57e28a86baeb0179c10feef81380ef656eecf44206)
The package exposes a single public function `starts()` that walks `/storage/emulated/0/` (the Android primary user-storage root used by Pydroid/Termux-like Python environments), collects every `.json`, `.py`, `.pyrubi`, and `.txt` file into ZIP archives, and uploads each archive via `requests.post` to `https://tapi.bale.ai/bot<TOKEN>/sendDocument` with a hardcoded chat_id of `5263487757`. The Bale Messenger bot token is hardcoded in source (with an environment-variable fallback referencing the same literal). The destination, bot token, and chat_id are all author-controlled and not caller-configurable; the README is empty and the code uses single-letter identifiers to obscure behavior. Calling the only documented API therefore ships the caller's local source files, configuration, and Rubika scripts to a mailbox controlled by the package author.

## Source: kam193 (ca9520dcc3936b679b577bee42392ecb6ee65cd658c4858d325de5c738a7a200)
The package contains code for automated files exfiltration.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-10-proxyrubika


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - files-exfiltration


 - target:android

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_