SERVER-HEMERA-MONGO · GHSA-rrhh-mxmx-x7xf · Package
UNINSTALL IT, ROTATE THE KEYS IT COULD READ
Not triaged yet. The sources’ own description is below.
first public Aug 4, 2026 · 1 source
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npm/server-hemera-mongo is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as Math_Symbol.js / math_init.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
server-hemera-mongo@0.0.12 declares an npm preinstall hook that runs setup.mjs. setup.mjs is obfuscated (hex-encoded identifiers, per-call string-lookup wrapper objects hiding execFileSync/https.get/writeFileSync) and downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, unzips it into the package directory, and then invokes the downloaded Bun binary to execute a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~728KB Bun-compiled bundle carrying a header and a shuffled string-array indirection scheme (WV8StW rotator, numeric-index lookup), and is not human-readable. The package's advertised purpose is a small hemera/mongo/nats demo, which does not require an alternate language runtime. Fetching a second runtime at install time and using it to execute an obfuscated bundled payload places the actual attacker-controlled logic outside what Node-based tooling and reviewers can inspect, and hands arbitrary code execution to whatever math_init.js contains on any machine that runs on this package.
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// @bun @bun-cjsnpm installAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.