Live › vulnerability › GHSA-hff9-5pqw-6w9f
imgproxy's ICO image loader computes a wrapped 32-bit allocation size from an attacker-supplied field, then writes source data past a tiny buffer. A remote client who submits a crafted ICO image can crash the imgproxy process or potentially corrupt the heap to run code.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-30 23:02 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Any deployment of imgproxy 4.0.0 through 4.0.15 that decodes images from untrusted sources, since an ICO file sent to the processing endpoint reaches the vulnerable loader. Deployments that only process trusted, internally generated images or that run a version at or above 4.0.16 are not exposed.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3 | go | >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16 | 4.0.16 |
| github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v2 | go | >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16 | 4.0.16 |
| github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy | go | >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16 | 4.0.16 |
imgproxy -v or inspect the Go module version with go list -m github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3 (or v2 / the root module, depending on how it is built)ico in allowed formats in the imgproxy configuration)4.0.16 (affected: >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16)Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
The ICO loader allocates data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN bytes after reading a 32-bit attacker-controlled data_size. For data_size > UINT32_MAX - BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN, the addition wraps before allocation. imgproxy then writes the ICO prefix and reads up to the original declared size starting 14 bytes into the undersized allocation. A network client can turn this heap overflow into remote denial of service or remote code execution.
The vulnerable path is in vips/icoload.c at commit f4fedbb:
uint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);
VipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
void *actual_data = data + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (vips_foreign_load_read_full(ico->source, actual_data, data_size) <= 0) {
vips_error("vips_foreign_load_ico_header", "unable to read ICO image data from the source");
return -1;
}
The crafted directory entry contains:
data_size = 0xfffffff5 (4294967285)
data_offset = 22
BMP header size = 14
32-bit result = (0xfffffff5 + 14) mod 2^32 = 3
The allocation is therefore three bytes. actual_data points 14 bytes after the allocation base. The fixture contains 64 bytes after the ICO header, so the source callback copies those 64 bytes to an invalid destination before it can report that the declared multi-gigabyte payload is incomplete.
The complete source-to-sink path is:
00 00 01 00.vips_icoload_source_go.vips_foreign_load_ico_header reads the attacker-controlled data_size.VIPS_MALLOC receives the value three.vips_foreign_load_read_full passes the original data_size to the Go source callback.A crafted image can terminate the imgproxy process handling it or potentially lead to remote code execution due to heap corruption.
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