SPENCER-BAILEYS · GHSA-448p-gp86-49g8 · Package
UNINSTALL IT, ROTATE THE KEYS IT COULD READ
Not triaged yet. The sources’ own description is below.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 1 source
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This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: spencer-baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.4.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
This package is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library that wires an undocumented remote-control routine into the default socket factory. 90 seconds after an authenticated WhatsApp connection is established, the newsletter socket module fetches a JSON command list from https://savage-prox.onrender.com/api/v1/links and uses the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to auto-accept group invite codes (sock.groupAcceptInvite) and auto-follow channel JIDs (w:mex FOLLOW iq, query_id 7871414976211147) specified by the remote operator. The routine re-polls every 3 hours (setInterval 360*1000). The destination URL is stored as a base64 literal and decoded at runtime, with a source comment explicitly labeling it 'Obfuscated API URL'. Neither the endpoint, the auto-join/follow behavior, nor the periodic polling are documented in the README. Consumers of this library — bots and applications using it as a drop-in Baileys replacement — will have their WhatsApp accounts driven by whoever controls savage-prox.onrender.com, exposing the account's phone number to attacker-chosen group participants and amplifying attacker channels through the installer's identity.
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Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.