CVE-2026-99307 · Runtime
NO FIX YET
The Linux kernel's CephFS client accepts a directory lease record from the metadata server that is shorter than the structure it expects. A malicious or compromised Ceph MDS can make the client read past the end of a received message during a lookup, which the KASAN report shows as an out-of-bounds read.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 3 sources
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Only Linux hosts that mount CephFS through the kernel ceph client are exposed, and the trigger is a malicious or compromised Ceph metadata server sending a crafted reply on lookup. Machines that do not mount CephFS, and those that use only managed Ceph storage without a kernel mount, are not affected. The sources do not say which kernel versions are vulnerable.
Not affected if no-cephfs-mount, trusted-mds
Who cares ceph, cephfs, kernel-client, linux-kernel
findmnt -t ceph or mount -t ceph. No ceph mount means not exposed.uname -r. The bug is in parse_reply_info_lease() in fs/ceph/mds_client.c. The patch's Fixes tag points to commit 4ac4c23eaa38 ("ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info"), so kernels carrying that commit are the ones to look at. Fixed stable versions are not published in the sources read: unknown. Check your distro's kernel changelog for the patch subject.Unknown from the sources.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: require the dentry lease record to cover struct ceph_mds_reply_lease
parse_reply_info_lease() reads a 32-bit struct_len off the wire and only checks that many bytes are present, without requiring struct_len to cover sizeof(struct ceph_mds_reply_lease) (10 bytes). A malicious MDS can declare a shorter record and still get the pointer published: the following *p += sizeof(**lease) overshoot is undone by *p = lend, so nothing downstream rejects the reply. ceph_fill_trace() -> update_dentry_lease() then reads 10 bytes through that pointer on any lookup on a mounted CephFS, running past the end of the message front.
Require the record to cover the structure, matching the sibling parse_reply_info_dir(). A conforming MDS always encodes the full 10 bytes.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459) Read of size 4 at addr ffff888026c63d65 by task kworker/0:3/2366 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: __update_dentry_lease.constprop.0 (fs/ceph/inode.c:1459) ceph_fill_trace (fs/ceph/inode.c:1474 fs/ceph/inode.c:1823) mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:4229 fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7225) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
The buggy address is located 357 bytes inside of allocated 360-byte region [ffff888026c63c00, ffff888026c63d68)
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