CVE-2026-99304 · Infrastructure
NO FIX YET
In the Linux kernel's Ceph filesystem client, a length check on snapshot trace data from the metadata server wraps around on overflow, so the check always passes. A malicious or compromised MDS can then cause the client to read memory past the end of a message buffer, a kernel out-of-bounds read reported by KASAN.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 3 sources
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Systems that mount CephFS with the Linux kernel client are exposed, since the flawed code handles snap traces from the MDS. The sources do not state which kernel versions are affected or fixed. Systems that do not use the kernel Ceph client can skip it.
Not affected if no-cephfs-kernel-client
Who cares ceph, cephfs, linux-kernel, self-hosted
mount -t ceph or findmnt -t ceph, or lsmod | grep ceph. ceph-fuse and non-Ceph hosts are not on this code path (the bug is in fs/ceph/snap.c)uname -r with your distro's kernel security notice for CVE-2026-99304; fixed versions are not published in the sources readUnknown from the sources.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check
ceph_update_snap_trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm with sizeof(u64) * (num_snaps + num_prior_parent_snaps). Both counts come straight off the wire as __le32, so the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64) promotes it to size_t: an MDS sending num_snaps = 1 and num_prior_parent_snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check degenerates to ceph_decode_need(&p, e, 0, bad), which always passes. dup_array() then reads num_snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message front, which ceph_msg_new2() allocates at exactly front_len bytes. An unsolicited CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SNAP reaches this from a malicious or compromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in an MDS reply and in a cap import.
Compute the length with size_add()/size_mul() so it saturates at SIZE_MAX instead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for num_export_targets.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500) ceph_update_snap_trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836) ceph_handle_snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155) mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7234) ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424) ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430) ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)
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