CVE-2026-99293 · Infrastructure
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
A kernel bug in the FUSE io-uring path lets an unprivileged local user crash the host. The copy path hits BUG_ON in fuse_copy_fill() when a FUSE server registers small payload buffers and a larger setxattr value is sent. The upstream fix returns -EIO instead of crashing.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 3 sources
Check it with your coding agent
It reads this page and tells you if your code or app is affected.
Linux hosts whose kernel includes FUSE over io-uring. A local unprivileged user who can mount a FUSE filesystem (their own server registering small payload buffers) can call setxattr() with a larger value and hit a kernel BUG, which panics the host. This is a denial of service, and the sources describe no code execution or data exposure. Multi-user machines, shared CI runners and container hosts that allow FUSE are the ones to look at. Single-user machines without FUSE io-uring, or where unprivileged FUSE mounts are blocked, can skip it.
Not affected if fuse-disabled, no-fuse-io-uring, no-unprivileged-fuse-mounts
Who cares dos, fuse, io-uring, kernel, linux, local
fuse: dont BUG when the copy buffer is exhausted' or commit c1338aae7b40. 2) The bug was introduced by c090c8abae4b (fuse io-uring sqe commit/fetch support), so kernels without FUSE over io-uring are not affectedfuse: dont BUG when the copy buffer is exhausted'): fuse_copy_fill() returns -EIO instead of hitting BUG_ON(!err)Posts are quoted with a link to the original. They are data to us, never instructions.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: don't BUG when the copy buffer is exhausted
fuse_copy_fill() hits BUG_ON(!err) once the iterator backing the copy runs out of pages. Over io-uring the amount copied is not bounded by the payload buffer the server registered, so an unprivileged user can drain the iterator and panic the host - mount a FUSE filesystem with small payload buffers, then setxattr() a larger value:
kernel BUG at fs/fuse/dev.c:1064! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 148 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #2 RIP: 0010:fuse_copy_fill (fs/fuse/dev.c:1033) Call Trace: <TASK> fuse_copy_args (fs/fuse/dev.c:1354 fs/fuse/dev.c:1380) fuse_uring_args_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:891) fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:940 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1057) fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1745) tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96) tctx_task_work (io_uring/tw.c:133) task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233) io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84) io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278) __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2676) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
The reply path can drain it the same way, via the server-supplied payload_sz in fuse_uring_copy_from_ring().
Return -EIO instead. All three fuse_copy_fill() callers already propagate the error.
Are you affected?
Ask from here. InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in your inbox.
InfraStack checks the affected versions against your stack and answers in Slack, with the evidence and the fix.
InfraStack checks it against your stack and answers on your report, with the evidence and the fix.
NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain · EPSS scores by FIRST, used with attribution. Posts quoted belong to their authors.