CVE-2026-93671 · Runtime
NO FIX YET
When WebSocket debug logging is enabled, a bad Sec-WebSocket-Accept header from a server makes the client's log call read past the end of its receive buffer. An attacker who controls or intercepts a ws:// connection can leak adjacent memory into device logs, or crash the connection thread.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 1 source
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Only builds that use the Zephyr websocket client with debug logging compiled in are exposed, because the defective log statement is absent from default builds. Exposure requires the device to connect to an attacker-controlled or attacker-terminated server, since the malicious accept header arrives before any authentication. Devices that use only TLS-protected connections to trusted servers, or default production configurations, can skip it.
Not affected if default-config, no-debug-logging, wss-trusted-server
Who cares embedded, iot, websocket-client, zephyr
CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4 is set in the build configurationsubsys/net/lib/websocket)Unknown from the sources.
The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSocket-Accept header value as a pointer/length pair from the HTTP parser. The referenced bytes live inside the application-supplied receive buffer and are not NUL terminated. When the received value did not match the expected accept key, the pointer was passed directly to a %s conversion in a NET_DBG() call, so the logging code measured the string with strlen() and read on past the end of the header value looking for a terminator.
The value is supplied by the peer during the WebSocket handshake, before any application-level authentication, so a malicious or man-in-the-middle server reached over a ws:// (or otherwise attacker-terminated) connection can trigger the mismatch branch at will simply by answering with a wrong accept key. By sizing the response so the header value ends at the tail of the buffer passed to websocket_connect() as wreq->tmp_buf, the peer can make the scan run off the end of that buffer and into adjacent memory. The defective log statement is compiled in only when websocket debug logging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4); it is absent from a default build, which bounds exposure to diagnostic configurations.
The consequence is an out-of-bounds read whose contents are emitted to the log stream: memory adjacent to the receive buffer is disclosed wherever the device's logs are collected or displayed. On targets where the memory following the buffer is not mapped, the scan can instead fault and terminate the connection or thread. No out-of-bounds write occurs, so there is no integrity impact.
The fix copies at most sizeof(got) - 1 bytes of the parser-provided slice into a bounded stack buffer, NUL terminates the copy, and logs that instead, so the formatter never reads beyond the bytes the parser actually offered.
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This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
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