Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-84298
Go to dashboardHatchet's V1 Dispatcher routes durable task callbacks by task UUID without checking tenant identity, so a worker from one tenant can receive another tenant's durable callback result payload. The attacker needs a valid worker in their own tenant and must know the victim's task UUID, which is hard to guess.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:13 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|
| github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet | go | < 0.95.3 | 0.95.3 |
Run go list -m github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet in each service that uses Hatchet, or check the version in go.mod; versions below 0.95.3 are affected.
Upgrade github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet to 0.95.3 or later.
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.95.3, the V1 DurableTask stream handler stores worker-supplied task_external_id values in the durableInvocations routing map before tenant ownership is verified, and callback delivery resolves that map by task UUID without tenant identity. An authenticated tenant worker that knows another tenant's durable task UUID and keeps a stream open on the same dispatcher process can receive that task's durable callback result payload. UUIDv4 values are not enumerable, and single-tenant deployments are unaffected in practice. This issue is fixed in version 0.95.3.
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