Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-61681
Go to dashboardThe SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in Hatchet makes a server-side HTTP GET to the UnsubscribeURL field, which is not covered by the AWS signature check. An authenticated tenant can point that field at an internal URL, so the Hatchet server fetches it.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:13 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet | go | < 0.91.2 | 0.91.2 |
go list -m github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet (version below 0.91.2 is affected per products field)
Check whether the SNS ingestor in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns is in use
Upgrade github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet to 0.91.2 (sources conflict: description says fixed in 0.91.1)
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.91.1, the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go calls http.Get() on payload.UnsubscribeURL after VerifyPayload() even though BuildSignature() excludes UnsubscribeURL, allowing an authenticated Hatchet tenant to replace that field in an otherwise valid AWS-signed message with an internal URL. The server-side request can reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal services, and internal HTTP APIs, potentially exposing IAM credentials or network-accessible data and functionality. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.
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