Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-61708
SOCFortress CoPilot's upload endpoint lets a customer_user account pick any storage bucket and object name, with no tenant or ownership check. An attacker can overwrite other tenants' case evidence, endpoint Sysmon configs and report templates, which can later lead to code execution.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-30 15:31 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Any deployment of CoPilot before 0.1.76 where customer_user accounts exist is exposed, because that role can reach the upload write path. Teams running CoPilot for several tenants face the most risk, since one tenant can overwrite another's evidence and configs. Single-tenant deployments with no customer_user accounts are less exposed.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
0.1.76 fix.backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py for the POST /api/agent_data_store/upload handler and confirm it restricts bucket_name and object_name.0.1.76 or later.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, POST /api/agent_data_store/upload in backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py permits customer_user callers to choose bucket_name and object_name without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml distributed to managed Windows endpoints, copilot-case-report-templates/<name> rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file> and velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
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