---
id: "CVE-2026-61708"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-61708"]
title: "SOCFortress CoPilot: low-privilege users can overwrite other tenants' data"
severity: "high"
cvss: 8.5
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "other"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["multi-tenant", "other", "security-operations", "self-hosted", "socfortress-copilot"]
not_affected_if: ["no-customer-user-accounts", "version-0.1.76-or-later"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T15:16:52+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T15:33:19+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61708", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00"}]
---

# SOCFortress CoPilot: low-privilege users can overwrite other tenants' data

SOCFortress CoPilot's upload endpoint lets a customer_user account pick any storage bucket and object name, with no tenant or ownership check. An attacker can overwrite other tenants' case evidence, endpoint Sysmon configs and report templates, which can later lead to code execution.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed CoPilot version against the `0.1.76` fix.
- Review `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` for the `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` handler and confirm it restricts bucket_name and object_name.
- List accounts with the customer_user role, since they are the ones who can reach this path.

## Fix

- Upgrade CoPilot to `0.1.76` or later.

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T15:31:11+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61708

## From the sources

SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/<name>` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file>` and `velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_