Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-53995
Go to dashboardMLflow's FileStore tracking backend does not sanitize trace IDs, so a crafted ID in a POST to /api/3.0/mlflow/traces makes the server write files outside the experiment trace directory. An unauthenticated attacker can plant attacker-controlled YAML and metadata files at paths the server process can write to.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:39 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|
| mlflow | pypi | <= 3.17.1 | 3.17.2 |
3.17.2 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
MLflow 3.17.1 and earlier contains a path traversal vulnerability in the FileStore tracking backend that allows unauthenticated attackers to control filesystem paths by submitting a crafted trace ID containing traversal sequences to the POST /api/3.0/mlflow/traces endpoint. Attackers can exploit FileStore.start_trace() to write trace_info.yaml, request_metadata, and tag files with attacker-controlled metadata outside the intended experiment trace directory, subject to the server process's filesystem permissions. FileStore is the default tracking backend before MLflow 3.7.0 and opt-in thereafter (the default changed to a SQLite database), so deployments in the earlier part of the affected range are vulnerable without special configuration while later ones are affected only when FileStore is explicitly selected.
This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-53995")
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.