--- id: "CVE-2026-53552" kind: "vulnerability" aliases: ["CVE-2026-53552", "GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv"] title: "Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers" severity: "critical" cvss: 9.6 epss: 0.0035 exploited: false status: "open" category: "package" products: [{"name": "github.com/zhenorzz/goploy", "fixed": ["1.18.0"], "affected": "<= 1.17.5", "ecosystem": "go"}] ecosystems: ["go"] tags: ["cwe-639", "cwe-863", "go", "goploy", "multi-tenant", "package", "self-hosted"] not_affected_if: ["fixed-version", "single-namespace"] published_at: "2026-07-07T23:42:12+00:00" first_seen_at: "2026-10-27T15:13:25+00:00" updated_at: "2026-10-27T15:14:44+00:00" sources: [{"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-27T15:13:25+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53552", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-27T15:32:59+00:00"}] --- # Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers Goploy's project file and project edit handlers take a project or file row id from the request body and act on it without checking the caller's namespace. A namespace manager can read, overwrite or delete files in other tenants' projects and rewrite their git remote URL, which runs attacker code on the next deploy. _Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._ ## Affected - go:github.com/zhenorzz/goploy affected <= 1.17.5 fixed 1.18.0 ## How to check - Check the installed version with `goploy --version` or the image tag; affected builds are `<= 1.17.5`. - Look for namespaces that have users with the `manager` role, since that role holds the `FileSync` and `EditProject` permissions. - Review project file and project URL changes in the database for unexpected edits to projects outside the caller's namespace. ## Fix - Upgrade Goploy to `1.18.0`. - Until upgrading, restrict the `manager` role to a single tenant or remove `FileSync` and `EditProject` from it. - Rotate any secrets stored in project files and deploy keys if cross-namespace access may have occurred. ## Timeline - 2026-10-27T15:13:25+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv - 2026-10-27T15:32:59+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53552 ## From the sources ### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree. ### Affected `zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`): ```go func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename) // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content) id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow() } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row): ```go func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)) file.WriteString(reqData.Content) } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id): ```go func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData() if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... } } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree): ```go func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc. projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow() if reqData.URL != projectData.URL { srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID) cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL) cmd.Dir = srcPath } } ``` `internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join: ```go func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) { err := sq. Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time"). From(projectFileTable). Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}). ... } ``` `internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`: ```go func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error { if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil } for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs { if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil } } return errors.New("no permission") } ``` ### Reachable Any logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints. ### Proof of concept Setup against the published Docker image: ```bash docker network create goploy-net docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \ -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \ mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password # Wait for MySQL, then load schema docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql' # Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306 docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \ -v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \ zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5 ``` Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned `manager` (role_id=1) only in their own namespace: ```bash # Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change) curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}' ADMIN_HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json' # Create NS_B curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns_b"}' # → {"data":{"id":2}} # Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \ -d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \ -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}' # Assign alice → NS_A (id=1), bob → NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \ -d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \ -d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}' # As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \ -d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git", "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync", "transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial", "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""}, "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \ -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\n"}' # Bob logs in (first-login change) curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"account":"bob","p --- _Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_