EGROUPWARE · CVE-2026-45016 · Package
FIX → 26.5.20260507 · 23.1.20260601
EGroupware's mail compose feature processes image URLs in HTML email bodies without restricting URI schemes, so a file:// URL makes the server read a local file. The file contents are then attached to outgoing email, which lets a logged-in user read files the web server process can access, including configuration with database credentials.
first public Jul 6, 2026 · 2 sources
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EGroupware installations that let users compose HTML mail with the mail app enabled are exposed; the flawed code runs when an image URL is embedded in an outgoing message. Any authenticated user with mail access can trigger it, so the attack needs an account. Instances on the fixed versions or without mail access can skip it.
Not affected if auth-required, no-mail-access
Who cares egroupware, mail, php, self-hosted
grep -i version on the installed api/src or the Composer lock file, then compare against the fixed versions below.api/src/Mail.php for the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') in the inline image handling (processURL2InlineImages).The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.
str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true
// api/src/Mail.php
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
{
//$isData = false;
$basedir = $data = '';
$needTempFile = true;
$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
{
(!(, ))
{
[] = ();
(( = ()) == ) = ;
= ([], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
[] = ::();
( () > && !(, )) { .= ; }
..
...
....
( []!= && () > && !(, )) { .= ; }
( && () && !(, ))
{
{
= (.());
}
(\ ) {
();
}
}
}
((, ))
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Upgrade to 26.5.20260507 · 23.1.20260601
egroupware/egroupware 26.x: move to 26.5.20260507egroupware/egroupware 23.1.x: move to 23.1.20260601<img src="file:///etc/passwd">.An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.
Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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