PRAISONAI · CVE-2026-34953 · AI agents & MCP
FIX → 4.5.97
PraisonAI's MCP HTTP server treats any Bearer token not in its empty internal store as valid, so requests are authenticated without credentials. An attacker with network access can list and run every registered tool, including agent execution, workflow runs, and container file read and write.
first public Mar 31, 2026 · 2 sources
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Teams running the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server (praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream) that is reachable from a network. The flaw is in the token check in OAuthManager.validate_token(), so any deployment that exposes the MCP HTTP endpoint with default settings is exposed. Local stdio use or deployments with the server bound to localhost behind a trusted network boundary are less exposed.
Not affected if auth-required, localhost-only, stdio-transport
Who cares ai-agents, mcp, praisonai, python
pip show praisonai; affected versions are 4.5.96 and below.praisonai mcp serve running with the http-stream transport, which binds to by default.OAuthManager.validate_token() returns True for any token not found in its internal store, which is empty by default. Any HTTP request to the MCP server with an arbitrary Bearer token is treated as authenticated, granting full access to all registered tools and agent capabilities.
oauth.py:364 (source) -> oauth.py:374 (loop miss) -> oauth.py:381 (sink)
# source
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
if stored_token.access_token == token:
return not stored_token.is_expired()
# sink -- _tokens is empty by default, loop never executes, falls through
return True
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0.0.0.0Upgrade to 4.5.97
praisonai upgrade to 4.5.97 (fixed version per the product data).# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
# start server: praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream --port 8080
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake_token_abc123" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/list","id":1}'
# expected output: 200 OK with full tool list (50+ tools)
# including praisonai.agent.run, praisonai.workflow.run, praisonai.containers.file_write
Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to the MCP HTTP server can call all registered tools including agent execution, workflow runs, container file read/write, and skill loading. The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default with no API key required.
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
if stored_token.access_token == token:
return not stored_token.is_expired()
# Unknown tokens must be rejected.
# For external/JWT tokens, call the introspection endpoint here before returning.
return False
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