PYLOAD-NG · CVE-2026-33992 · Package
NO FIX YET
pyLoad's download engine fetches any URL submitted in a package without checking the destination, so a logged-in user can point it at internal addresses. On cloud hosts this can expose instance metadata, including SSH keys and credentials placed in cloud-init.
first public Mar 25, 2026 · 2 sources
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Any pyLoad instance that accepts package links from logged-in users is exposed, and the impact is greatest on cloud VMs whose metadata service at 169.254.169.254 holds secrets. Self-hosted pyLoad on a home network with no cloud metadata service has a much smaller impact, though internal services can still be probed. The advisory's remediation suggests blocking private ranges and metadata endpoints, but no fixed version is stated in the sources.
Not affected if auth-required, managed-hosting, no-cloud-metadata-service
Who cares cloud, digitalocean, pyload-ng, python, self-hosted
pip show pyload-ng and compare it to the affected range <= 0.5.0b3.dev96Unknown from the sources.
PyLoad's download engine accepts arbitrary URLs without validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. An authenticated attacker can exploit this to access internal network services and exfiltrate cloud provider metadata. On DigitalOcean droplets, this exposes sensitive infrastructure data including droplet ID, network configuration, region, authentication keys, and SSH keys configured in user-data/cloud-init.
The vulnerability exists in PyLoad's download package functionality (/api/addPackage endpoint), which directly passes user-supplied URLs to the download engine without validating the destination. The affected code in src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py:
@bp.route("/addPackage", methods=["POST"], endpoint="add_package")
@login_required
def add_package():
name = flask.request.form["add_name"]
links = flask.request.form["add_links"].split("\n")
# ... validation omitted ...
api.add_package(name, links, dest) # No URL validation
The download engine in src/pyload/core/managers/download.py accepts any URL scheme and initiates HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network addresses and cloud metadata endpoints.
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Live Demo Instance: http://143.244.141.81:8000
Credentials: pyload / pyload
http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json
The downloaded v1.json file contains sensitive cloud infrastructure data:
Vulnerability Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CVSS Score: 7.7 - 9.1 (High to Critical, depending on cloud deployment)
Implement URL validation in the download engine:
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.