CVE-2026-129858 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
Microsoft jxrlib and the mircomir fork parse JPEG XR files with a signature check that reads past a stack buffer when the 8 signature bytes contain no zero byte. An attacker who supplies a crafted JPEG XR file can make the application crash.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 1 source
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Applications that decode JPEG XR images with jxrlib, Microsoft's library or the mircomir fork, are exposed when they accept image files from untrusted sources. The flaw is in the header parsing path ReadWMIHeader() in image/decode/strdec.c, so programs that never open JPEG XR files can skip it. Impact is a crash of the application; the sources do not describe code execution.
Not affected if no-jpeg-xr-decoding, untrusted-input-not-accepted
Who cares c, image-decoding, jxrlib
jxrlib1.1 and the mircomir fork before 1.3.6 are affected1.3.6 or laterMicrosoft jxrlib through 1.1 and the mircomir jxrlib fork before 1.3.6 contain a stack buffer over-read vulnerability in ReadWMIHeader() in image/decode/strdec.c due to an unterminated signature buffer. Attackers can supply a crafted JPEG XR file whose 8 signature bytes contain no zero byte, causing strstr to read past the stack buffer and potentially crash the application.
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