VULNERABILITY-LOOKUP · CVE-2026-129703 · Other
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
A feed key or API key sent in a URL parameter or header makes the server set a login session cookie for the account. Anyone holding a leaked feed URL or API key can open a logged-in session, including the admin interface for admin accounts.
first public Nov 16, 2026 · 3 sources
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Self-hosted vulnerability-lookup web applications that use feed keys (RSS/Atom feed URLs) or API keys. Anyone holding a leaked feed URL or API key gets a browser session as that user without password or 2FA, including the /admin interface for administrator accounts. Instances where nobody has created feed or API keys have no key to leak.
Not affected if no-api-keys, no-feed-keys
Who cares api-keys, rss, self-hosted, vulnerability-lookup
In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the authentication decorators for feed-key requests (auth_feedkey_func in website/decorators.py) and API-key requests (auth_func in website/web/api/v1/common.py) called Flask-Login's login_user() function. This caused the HTTP response to a request authenticated solely by a feed key (supplied as the X-FEED-KEY URL parameter) or an API key (supplied as the X-API-KEY header) to set a session cookie that grants full authenticated access to every page in the application, without requiring a password or two-factor authentication.
The practical impact is that any party possessing a leaked feed URL (a common occurrence, as feed URLs are shared with RSS readers) or an API key could obtain a valid web session for the associated account. This session provides access to the user's account page, which exposes the API key and other profile data, and for accounts with the administrator role, access to the /admin interface, enabling full administrative control of the application.
The vulnerability affects all users whose feed key or API key is exposed. No prior authentication, user interaction, or special network conditions are required; a single HTTP request with the token is sufficient to establish the session. The session persists until it expires, and because it is not bound to the original credential (a related CWE-613 issue noted by the developers), revoking the feed key or API key does not invalidate the already-created session.
The fix replaces the login_user() call with assignment to g._login_user, which Flask-Login's current_user property reads for the current request only, without writing any session cookie. The affected views remain unchanged and continue to see the authenticated user for the single request.
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v6.4.0 (5 Nov 2026)This page as .md · .json · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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