CVE-2026-119446 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
NervesHub's CLI login flow lets an unauthenticated attacker start a login and receive an API token for another user's account once that user clicks Confirm on a crafted link. The confirmation code is shown but never checked, so the attacker gets full access to the victim's account.
first public Nov 10, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams running a self-hosted NervesHub web server from 2.5.0 up to but not including 2.5.3 are exposed, because the CLI login endpoint is reachable without authentication. The attack needs a signed-in user to open a crafted link and click Confirm, so deployments that only the team uses internally still carry risk if users are tricked. Managed or vendor-hosted NervesHub instances are handled by their operator.
Not affected if managed-hosting, version-2.5.3-or-later, version-below-2.5.0
Who cares elixir, nerves-hub, nerves_hub, self-hosted
nerves_hub version in the release or mix.exs; affected releases are from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.POST /api/auth/cli_session endpoint on your NervesHub web deployment.nerves_hub 2.5.3 or later (the sources state the fix is in 2.5.3 and later).Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login.
The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves.
This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
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