---
id: "CVE-2026-119446"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-119446"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-119446"]
title: "NervesHub: CLI login flaw lets an attacker take a user's API token"
severity: "critical"
cvss: 9.4
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["elixir", "nerves-hub", "nerves_hub", "package", "self-hosted"]
not_affected_if: ["managed-hosting", "version-2.5.3-or-later", "version-below-2.5.0"]
published_at: "2026-11-10T11:16:40+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-10T11:21:35+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-10T11:21:58+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119446", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-10T11:21:35+00:00"}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# NervesHub: CLI login flaw lets an attacker take a user's API token

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CVE-2026-119446 (this .md is for agents)

NervesHub's CLI login flow lets an unauthenticated attacker start a login and receive an API token for another user's account once that user clicks Confirm on a crafted link. The confirmation code is shown but never checked, so the attacker gets full access to the victim's account.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the deployed `nerves_hub` version in the release or `mix.exs`; affected releases are from `2.5.0` before `2.5.3`.
- Look for the `POST /api/auth/cli_session` endpoint on your NervesHub web deployment.

## Fix

- `nerves_hub` `2.5.3` or later (the sources state the fix is in 2.5.3 and later).

## Timeline

- 2026-11-10T11:21:35+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119446

## Documents

- [advisory] Vendor advisory: github.com https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-9vr9-463q-46qp
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508
- [fix] Patch: github.com https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564

## From the sources

Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login.

The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves.

This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.

---

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