Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-119038
Business::GoCardless for Perl, before version 1.01, completes GoCardless redirect flows without checking the session that started them. An attacker holding another customer's redirect flow ID can create payments or subscriptions against that customer's mandate.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-30 13:30 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Applications that use the Business::GoCardless Perl module to take payments through GoCardless redirect flows are exposed. The flaw lies in confirm_resource, which completes a flow from the flow ID alone, so exposure depends on whether that flow ID can reach an attacker. Teams that do not use this module can skip it.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
perl -MBusiness::GoCardless -e 'print $Business::GoCardless::VERSION' or the CPAN metadata1.01 or laterEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
Business::GoCardless versions before 1.01 for Perl complete redirect flows without checking the session token, letting a leaked redirect flow ID create payments against another customer's mandate.
confirm_resource takes no session token from the caller. It reads the redirect flow back from the GoCardless API and completes it with the token from that response, so the check that the flow is completed by the session that started it always passes. It then creates the requested payment or subscription against the flow's mandate. Since version 1.00, a flow that already has a mandate is returned as confirmed without being completed again, so the same ID creates a new payment on every call.
A remote attacker who obtains another customer's redirect flow ID can create payments or subscriptions against that customer's mandate.
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