---
id: "CVE-2026-119038"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-119038"]
title: "Perl GoCardless library lets a leaked redirect ID charge another customer"
severity: "high"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["gocardless", "package", "payments", "perl"]
not_affected_if: ["not-using-business-gocardless"]
published_at: "2026-10-30T13:18:32+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-30T13:32:19+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119038", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00"}]
---

# Perl GoCardless library lets a leaked redirect ID charge another customer

Business::GoCardless for Perl, before version 1.01, completes GoCardless redirect flows without checking the session that started them. An attacker holding another customer's redirect flow ID can create payments or subscriptions against that customer's mandate.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Check the installed version of Business::GoCardless with `perl -MBusiness::GoCardless -e 'print $Business::GoCardless::VERSION'` or the CPAN metadata
- Look for calls to confirm_resource in your code

## Fix

- Business::GoCardless: move to version `1.01` or later

## Timeline

- 2026-10-30T13:30:27+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119038

## From the sources

Business::GoCardless versions before 1.01 for Perl complete redirect flows without checking the session token, letting a leaked redirect flow ID create payments against another customer's mandate.

confirm_resource takes no session token from the caller. It reads the redirect flow back from the GoCardless API and completes it with the token from that response, so the check that the flow is completed by the session that started it always passes. It then creates the requested payment or subscription against the flow's mandate. Since version 1.00, a flow that already has a mandate is returned as confirmed without being completed again, so the same ID creates a new payment on every call.

A remote attacker who obtains another customer's redirect flow ID can create payments or subscriptions against that customer's mandate.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_