CVE-2026-115770 · Runtime
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
Pocket ID, a self-hosted OIDC login provider, lets a normal user change their account email after requesting a verification token, then redeem the old token to mark the new address as verified. An attacker can then present a verified email that belongs to another user's account, which relying applications that match accounts by email may accept.
first public Jul 29, 2026 · 1 source
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Teams running a self-hosted Pocket ID instance in the affected range, especially with the default settings allowing users to edit their own account and not requiring email verification. Exposure is downstream: it matters when a relying application trusts the verified email claim for automatic account linking or provisioning. Applications that rely only on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that consequence.
Not affected if allowownaccountedit-disabled, relying-apps-use-sub-only, version-2.12.0-or-later
Who cares oidc, passkeys, pocket-id, self-hosted
2.2.0 through 2.12.0 (exclusive of the fix).allowOwnAccountEdit is true (the default affected setting).emailsVerified is false (the default affected setting).sub claim.Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.2.0 until 2.12.0, SendEmailVerification uses the token model in backend/internal/model/email_verification_token.go to bind an email-verification token only to the user's identifier, while UpdateUser can change the account email without invalidating the outstanding token and VerifyEmail marks the current address as verified. An ordinary user can request a token for an address they control, change the account to an arbitrary unused address, and redeem the old token so Pocket ID publishes the new address with email_verified set to true. The default affected configuration uses emailsVerified=false and allowOwnAccountEdit=true; the target address must not already belong to another Pocket ID user. A relying application that trusts a verified email for automatic account matching or provisioning can link the attacker's identity to another user's account, while applications that rely exclusively on the stable OIDC sub claim are not affected by that downstream consequence. This issue is fixed in version 2.12.0.
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2.12.0NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.