Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-113661
Go to dashboardsanitize-html versions before 2.18.0 keep a meta refresh URL inside the content attribute even when its scheme is javascript: or data:, when an integrator has allowed meta with http-equiv and content. A viewer of the sanitized HTML can be redirected to attacker-chosen URLs or run script, which is stored XSS or open redirect.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 3h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| sanitize-html | npm | < 2.18.0 | 2.18.0 |
Run: npm ls sanitize-html
Search your sanitize-html calls for allowedTags or allowedAttributes containing meta together with http-equiv or content.
2.18.0 or latermetacontentEach row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
CVE-2026-53606 expanded allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes so named URL attributes (action, formaction, data, poster, background, later ping, xlink:href, …) go through naughtyHref(). A URL nested inside meta content (http-equiv=refresh) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked.
Default allowedTags still omit meta. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow meta plus http-equiv / content.
On 2.17.7:
sanitizeHtml(
'<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)">',
{ allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } }
)
// => <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)" />
data:text/html,… and arbitrary https: destinations also survive. formaction="javascript:…" (53606) is stripped.
Please Request CVE. Credit: Finder + Reporter (adrbogacz).
naughtyHref() only runs when the attribute name is in allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes (index.js ~385). Refresh URLs live in a content value of the form 0;url=…, so the gate never fires. Adding content to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta content (description, viewport).
Fix: when http-equiv is refresh (case-insensitive), parse the ; url= destination and run naughtyHref('meta', url). Drop content (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other meta content values alone.
Local [email protected]. Output inspection only:
node -e '
const sanitize = require("sanitize-html");
const opts = { allowedTags: ["meta"], allowedAttributes: { meta: ["http-equiv", "content"] } };
for (const html of [
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=javascript:alert(1)\">",
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=data:text/html,aaa\">",
"<form><button formaction=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</button></form>",
]) {
console.log(html, "=>", sanitize(html, html.includes("meta") ? opts : { allowedTags: ["form","button"], allowedAttributes: { button: ["formaction"] } }));
}
'
Expected: refresh javascript: / data: remain; 53606 formaction is removed. Do not attach a browser hang or stored-XSS page.
An integrator who allowed meta + content expecting allowedSchemes to apply (the 53606 configuration pattern) still emits a refresh to javascript:, data:, or an attacker https: URL. Stored XSS / open redirect for viewers of that HTML. Default config is not affected.
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