Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-113654
Go to dashboardsanitize-html discards element content for tags listed in nonTextTags, but a crafted <noscript> with an implied close ends that discard region early, so markup after it is passed through. An attacker can get elements such as img beacons or links into sanitized output that a browser with scripting enabled would show as inert text, which enables markup injection (CWE-79).
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 19:11 UTC, 3h before NVD. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| sanitize-html | npm | < 2.18.0 | 2.18.0 |
npm ls sanitize-html and check whether the version is below 2.18.0<div><noscript></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif"></noscript>, {allowedTags:["div","img"],allowedAttributes:{img:["src"]},nonTextTags:["script","style","textarea","option","noscript"]}) and see whether an img tag is returnedUpgrade sanitize-html to or later.
2.18.0Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
sanitize-html discards the content of every element in nonTextTags. It delimits that region
using htmlparser2's close events, and ignores the isImplied flag htmlparser2 passes it. Closing a
still-open ancestor from inside a <noscript> makes htmlparser2 unwind its stack past the
noscript; the synthetic implied close it emits on the way ends the discard region early, and
everything after it is treated as ordinary body content.
A browser with scripting enabled parses <noscript> content as raw text, so the same markup
renders as inert text there. The sanitizer therefore emits elements the page itself would not have.
const sanitizeHtml = require("sanitize-html");
sanitizeHtml('<div><noscript></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif"></noscript>', {
allowedTags: ["div", "img"],
allowedAttributes: { img: ["src"] },
nonTextTags: ["script", "style", "textarea", "option", "noscript"],
});
// => '<div></div><img src="http://evil.test/t.gif" />'
Chrome, given the same input, renders no <img> — the whole payload is raw text inside the
unclosed <noscript>. Verified with Playwright, srcdoc into an iframe so the scripting flag is on.
A <![CDATA[ variant hides the opening tag from the parser entirely and has the same effect:
<p>Hi</p><![CDATA[ x > <noscript>]]><a href="…">Reset your password</a><img src="…beacon.gif"></noscript>
htmlparser2 runs a CDATA token to ]]>; Chrome ends a bogus comment at the first >, so the
<noscript> after it is real to the browser and invisible to the parser.
index.js:
:154 — nonTextTagsArray (the default list, ['script','style','textarea','option','xmp']).:638 — onclosetag: function (name, isImplied) — receives the flag.:644 — skipTextDepth-- — decrements without consulting isImplied.Do not end a discard region on an implied close. htmlparser2 already distinguishes them; the flag is passed and discarded. Something close to:
onclosetag: function (name, isImplied) {
if (skipText) {
if (isImplied) return; // an implied close must not end the region
skipTextDepth--;
…
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