Live › vulnerability › CVE-2026-112268
Go to dashboardsglang-router (sgl-model-gateway) through 0.3.2 lets holders of the data-plane API key reach /ha/* management endpoints, because those routes skip the control-plane Admin role check. An attacker with that key can read cluster topology, change gossiped configuration and global rate limits, and call POST /ha/shutdown to dissolve HA coordination.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-23 21:57 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
Teams running sglang-router or sgl-model-gateway through 0.3.2 in high-availability mode, where data-plane API keys are issued to clients or services. Exposure depends on whether those keys reach untrusted callers. Deployments that run a single router without HA mesh, or that never share data-plane keys beyond trusted services, have a smaller exposure; the sources do not say more.
No product ranges from the sources yet.
0.3.2 (fixed version unknown from the sources)Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
sglang-router (sgl-model-gateway) through 0.3.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows holders of the data-plane API key to access mesh HA management routes because /ha/* endpoints skip control-plane Admin role checks. Attackers can read cluster topology, write gossiped configuration, change global rate limits, and call POST /ha/shutdown to silently dissolve HA coordination.
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