---
id: "CVE-2026-112268"
kind: "vulnerability"
aliases: ["CVE-2026-112268"]
title: "sglang-router: data-plane API key reaches HA admin routes and shutdown"
severity: "medium"
cvss: 6.3
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "ai-tooling"
products: []
ecosystems: []
tags: ["ai-gateway", "ai-tooling", "llm-serving", "self-hosted", "sgl-model-gateway", "sglang"]
not_affected_if: ["data-plane-key-not-shared", "single-router-no-ha"]
published_at: "2026-10-19T14:17:04+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-23T21:57:18+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-25T04:01:45+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "nvd", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112268", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-23T21:57:18+00:00"}]
---

# sglang-router: data-plane API key reaches HA admin routes and shutdown

sglang-router (sgl-model-gateway) through 0.3.2 lets holders of the data-plane API key reach /ha/* management endpoints, because those routes skip the control-plane Admin role check. An attacker with that key can read cluster topology, change gossiped configuration and global rate limits, and call POST /ha/shutdown to dissolve HA coordination.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## How to check

- Find the installed sglang-router or sgl-model-gateway version and compare it with the sources' fixed release, which the sources do not name
- Check whether the router exposes /ha/* endpoints on a network the data-plane key can reach
- unknown whether the sources describe a configuration-only check

## Fix

- Upgrade sglang-router / sgl-model-gateway past `0.3.2` (fixed version unknown from the sources)
- Rotate the data-plane API key if it may have been shared beyond trusted clients
- Restrict access to /ha/* at the network layer until upgraded

## Timeline

- 2026-10-23T21:57:18+00:00 nvd https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112268

## From the sources

sglang-router (sgl-model-gateway) through 0.3.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows holders of the data-plane API key to access mesh HA management routes because /ha/* endpoints skip control-plane Admin role checks. Attackers can read cluster topology, write gossiped configuration, change global rate limits, and call POST /ha/shutdown to silently dissolve HA coordination.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_