CVE-2026-104136 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
OpenEMR, an electronic health records application, has a recall feature that accepts a patient identifier without checking the user's access to that patient. A logged-in low-privilege user who knows or enumerates a patient ID can read patient details, contact fields, appointments and recall information.
first public Aug 18, 2026 · 1 source
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Clinics and practices that run OpenEMR with staff accounts that have limited privileges are exposed, since any authenticated user can reach the recall handler with a patient ID. Installations on 8.3.0 or later are not affected, and instances where only fully trusted staff have accounts carry less risk.
Not affected if no-untrusted-staff-accounts, version-8.3.0-or-later
Who cares healthcare, openemr, php, self-hosted
version.php at the install root.new_recall) feature is used at all in your deployment.8.3.0 or later.OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to 8.3.0, the new_recall branch of interface/main/messages/save.php accepts a caller-supplied pid without enforcing patient-level or recall-workflow authorization. A low-privilege authenticated user who knows or enumerates a patient identifier can retrieve patient details, contact fields, HIPAA notification preferences, recent appointment information, and existing recall information. This issue is fixed in version 8.3.0.
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