PYQUOKKA · CVE-2025-62515 · Package
NO FIX YET · SEE WHAT TO DO
pyquokka's FlightServer passes data sent by Flight clients straight to pickle.loads() in do_action, with no validation. A remote client can send a crafted pickle payload and run arbitrary commands on the server.
first public Oct 17, 2025 · 2 sources
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Any application that runs pyquokka's FlightServer and exposes its port beyond the local machine is exposed, because the flaw is reached by sending a payload to the set_configs action over the network. Installations that bind the server only to 127.0.0.1 or do not run FlightServer at all are not reachable this way, though the advisory notes that the same pickle.loads use appears in cache_garbage_collect, do_put and do_get.
Not affected if flight-server-not-used, localhost-only-binding
Who cares pyarrow-flight, pyquokka, python, self-hosted
pyquokka is installed and at what version: pip show pyquokkaFlightServer started with a 0.0.0.0 host in your code or deployment configgrpc+tcp://0.0.0.0:5005) is reachable from other machinesIn the FlightServer class of the pyquokka framework, the do_action() method directly uses pickle.loads() to deserialize action bodies received from Flight clients without any sanitization or validation, which results in a remote code execution vulnerability. The vulnerable code is located in pyquokka/flight.py at line 283, where arbitrary data from Flight clients is directly passed to pickle.loads().
Even more concerning, when FlightServer is configured to listen on 0.0.0.0 (as shown in the provided server example at line 339), this allows attackers across the entire network to perform arbitrary remote code execution by sending malicious pickled payloads through the set_configs action.
In addition, the functions cache_garbage_collect, do_put, and do_get also contain vulnerability points where pickle.loads is used to deserialize untrusted remote data. Please review and fix these issues accordingly. This report uses the set_configs action as an example.
server = FlightServer("0.0.0.0", location = "grpc+tcp://0.0.0.0:5005")
server.serve()
class RCE:
def ():
os
(os.system, (,))
pickle
action_body = pickle.dumps(RCE())
action = pyarrow.flight.Action(, action_body)
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<= 0.3.1; fixed version not stated in the sourcesWhen the server receives this payload, the FlightServer.do_action() method calls pickle.loads(action.body.to_pybytes()) on line 283, which triggers the execution of the malicious code through Python's pickle deserialization mechanism. The provided flight_client.py demonstrates a complete PoC that connects to the vulnerable server and executes arbitrary commands through the pickle deserialization vulnerability.
When the vulnerability is reproduced, python flight.py can be run to init the server and then run flight_client.py. There is an attack demo in the attachment.
Remote code execution on the victim's machine over the network. Once the victim starts the FlightServer with network binding (especially 0.0.0.0), an attacker on the network can gain arbitrary code execution by connecting to the Flight endpoint and sending crafted pickle payloads through the set_configs action. This vulnerability allows for:
Replace unsafe deserialization: Replace pickle.loads() with safer alternatives such as:
Unpickler with a restricted find_class() method that only allows whitelisted classesNetwork security:
127.0.0.1) instead of 0.0.0.0Security warnings: When starting the service on public interfaces, display clear security warnings to inform users about the risks.
This page as .md · .json · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
GitHub Advisory Database, CC-BY 4.0 · NVD data is provided by NIST and is public domain. Posts quoted belong to their authors.