---
id: "CMP-202611-b4u4qv"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-b4u4qv"
kind: "campaign"
aliases: []
title: "OPTIMJACK: attacker code injected into Optimizely-hosted JavaScript steals visitors' crypto and card details on big websites (CNN, Zoom, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: true
status: "open"
category: "vendor"
products: [{"name": "Optimizely", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Optimizely"}, {"name": "Confiant", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Confiant"}, {"name": "Jscrambler", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Jscrambler"}, {"name": "Kissmetrics", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": ""}, {"name": "StorifyMe", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": ""}, {"name": "Minute Media", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": ""}, {"name": "Optimizely Web", "fixed": [], "affected": "", "ecosystem": ""}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["campaign", "early-warning"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: null
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T21:58:40+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-17T00:01:13+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "analyst", "url": "https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T21:58:40+00:00", "cites": ["https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/"]}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T23:20:28+00:00", "cites": ["https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/"]}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-17T00:01:13+00:00", "cites": ["https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# OPTIMJACK: attacker code injected into Optimizely-hosted JavaScript steals visitors' crypto and card details on big websites (CNN, Zoom, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/CMP-202611-b4u4qv (this .md is for agents)

On 16 Nov 2026 an attacker wrote code into the Project JavaScript (projectJS) of Optimizely Web customer projects, so snippets served from cdn.optimizely.com (and customers' self-hosted copies of the same snippets, e.g. opt.scheels.com, vodafone.com.au) loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js. Report URI (Scott Helme) found 188 of 1,611 snippets checked infected, belonging to 178 organisations, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab (about.gitlab.com and gitlab.com), IKEA, HSBC (US, Hong Kong, UAE, Singapore insurance), Equifax, Paychex, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Smartsheet, TalkTalk, Hootsuite/Talkwalker, Virgin Media O2, Stamps.com, Tricentis, Mutual of Omaha and Optimizely's own www and login pages; the real number is likely higher. First Optimizely injection 04:21 UTC 16 Nov (BBC); mass clean-up about 20:40-21:10 UTC; at 21:52 UTC 1 of 188 snippets was still infected (TalkTalk). Smartsheet was re-infected after cleaning, so the attacker still had write access then. An earlier wave from 13 Nov (first capture 05:42 UTC) used the same actor's injector webshell[.]lol/get.js through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media (minute-ly) scripts on sites such as securitybank.com, faz.net, smh.com.au, unibas.ch, vidaxl.co.uk and foxsports.com (Hudson Rock); webshell[.]lol has been seen since 17 Sep on Turkish sites. The payload (rebuilt 26 times) swaps crypto wallet addresses in pages, clipboard and outgoing requests; from 13:43 UTC skims card number/expiry/CVV typed into a site's own forms (not hosted payment iframes); sends non-HttpOnly cookies, page URL and a screenshot; and on iPhones/iPads loads Coruna (iOS 13-17) or DarkSword (iOS 18.x) exploit chains (iOS 26 only fingerprinted). Some copies (BBC, HSBC UAE) embed the full payload and run it if 1688360[.]cc is blocked. Attacker wallets received about 7,040 USD. How the attacker got write access to Optimizely and the other providers is unknown; Optimizely has not published a statement.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- :Optimizely affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Confiant affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Jscrambler affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Kissmetrics affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :StorifyMe affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Minute Media affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Optimizely Web affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## Cause

How the attacker got in: not disclosed yet (unknown). The record says attacker code was written into Optimizely's projectJS, so the scripts served to visitors were altered at the provider, but 'How the attacker got write access to Optimizely and the other providers is unknown.'

How it reached others: customers' data or keys went with it (third-party-breach).

Last month's incidents with the same cause, and the full checklist: https://infrastack.ai/live/breaches.md#third-party-breach

## How to check

Fetch the Optimizely snippet(s) your site serves (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project>.js, /public/<id>/s/*.js, or your self-hosted copy) and search the projectJS field for '1688360', 'webshell', '.icu', 'track.js', and for atob( or eval( of base64 strings (one variant hides the URL in base64, another embeds the whole payload); record the Last-Modified header. Files were cleaned on 16 Nov, so a clean file now does not prove it was clean earlier. Also check Kissmetrics (i.kissmetrics.com/i.js, i.kissmetrics.io/i.js, scripts.kissmetrics.io), StorifyMe (cdn.storifyme.com, storifyme.xyz widgets and web components), Minute Media (apv-static.minute-ly.com/resources/v2/loader.js), Confiant and Jscrambler-served scripts from 13 Nov on. Search CSP reports, proxy and DNS logs back to 13 Nov for webshell[.]lol (/get.js), 1688360[.]cc (/track.js, /hit.php, /card.php, /html2canvas.min.js; IP 136.113.106.136), the iOS-stage hosts 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, p55abnw2pnsz0bo[.]icu (34.96.213.201), eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, 1y69gy2mdzaltz1[.]icu, gm38duxoihbmy5o[.]icu (34.87.36.58), l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo[.]icu, and paths /boot.js, /JIUJIU888/weifile.html, /JIUJIU888/index.js, /A8/, /B9/, /C10/, /D11/, /D12/. SHA-256 of one track.js version f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 (payload rebuilt 26 times, so match on domains and behavior), boot.js 2f69879f1c5bdfe9c075ef67ddb6405afe992aff89dcf42863567f83237d3ba6. In a browser, sessionStorage keys starting with 'cc_' on an affected site mean a card was captured; an iPhone page that reloads every 60 seconds is a symptom of the exploit retry. Attacker wallets: ETH/BSC 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e, BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, LTC ltc1q3wp7g6ds0ggg6fl6kncpa4sepn0q3qfacgred5, TRX THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa, SOL FVtL8NMYS9PA1v3HE67XUGCtGA9JaZUvqav2fU2LrV5n.

## Fix

If you load Optimizely Web, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or Minute Media scripts, inspect what you serve now. If it carries the loader, remove or pause the snippet until it is clean, and ask the provider which projects were modified, when and how. Rotate your Optimizely account credentials and API tokens and review project change history, since the attacker re-infected a cleaned project. Blocking 1688360[.]cc, webshell[.]lol, 136.113.106.136 and the .icu hosts helps but is not enough: some copies carry the full payload inline, so the code itself must be removed. Enforce a CSP host allowlist in script-src and connect-src (a nonce plus strict-dynamic policy does not block it). Remove third-party tags from checkout, payment and login pages. If the payload ran on checkout or payment pages, treat it as card-data exposure; if it ran on logged-in pages, treat non-HttpOnly cookies as stolen and expire those sessions. Aikido advises GitLab Dedicated and self-managed admins to turn on GitLab's IP address restrictions to limit the impact of any exposed sessions while the incident unfolds. Visitors: check any wallet address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen before sending crypto (copied addresses may already be swapped), watch card statements, and update iPhones (the kit itself says iOS 18.7.3+ and 26.3+ are patched).

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T21:58:40+00:00 analyst https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/
- 2026-11-16T23:20:28+00:00 analyst https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/ — StepSecurity write-up: exposure window 08:28-21:23 UTC 16 Nov (at least 13h), payload edited 4 times (first-capture hash differs), Optimizely cleaning files (41 of 188 still infected at 21:32 UTC), 4 more .icu iOS-stage domains and hosting IPs, more named sites (KLM, American Girl, Scheels, UNICEF USA, Change.org, IG, TSN, Bitly), ~$6,600 received by attacker wallets
- 2026-11-17T00:01:13+00:00 analyst https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/ — Report URI: 178 orgs / 188 of 1,611 snippets (adds gitlab.com, IKEA, HSBC US/HK/UAE, Equifax, Ledger, Peacock, TalkTalk, Optimizely login page), base64 and inline-fallback variants, re-infection after cleaning, 1 snippet left at 21:52 UTC, about 7,040 USD, LTC wallet. Hudson Rock: earlier wave from 13 Nov via Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, Minute Media with webshell[.]lol/get.js. Aikido: GitLab admins should set IP restrictions for exposed sessions.

## Documents

- [describes] Breach of a 3rd-party JavaScript host impacting high value websites https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50523506
- [describes] CNN, Zoom, Fox News Served Visitors a Crypto-Stealing Skimmer – OPTIMJACK (Nov 2026) https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skimmer/
- [discussion] Breach of a 3rd-party JavaScript host impacting high value websites https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50524121
- [discussion] StepSecurity: OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer on 186 Confirmed Sites https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer
- [discussion] @troyhunt: I was working through this today with @Scott_Helme, and it’s MASSIVE! Most sites https://x.com/troyhunt/status/2122466658065527202
- [discussion] Kevin Beaumont: Awkward, HSBC and a bunch of other banks serving money-stealing malware. https:/ https://cyberplace.social/@GossiTheDog/117628699310551936
- [discussion] @troyhunt: Incidentally, we were both protected from the malware initially because @The_Pi_ https://x.com/troyhunt/status/2122471092430438553
- [discussion] @AikidoSecurity: Related to the Optimizely breach: https://t.co/3TGInHBXcl https://x.com/AikidoSecurity/status/2122470354505629820
- [discussion] @AikidoSecurity: For Gitlab users, we recommend using Gitlab's IP security feature as a bare mini https://x.com/AikidoSecurity/status/2122470181767127153
- [discussion] @AikidoSecurity: While this incident is unfolding, we recommend GitLab dedicated and self-managed https://x.com/AikidoSecurity/status/2122476018321522819
- [discussion] Report URI (Scott Helme): World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
- [discussion] Hudson Rock: Poisoned Scripts on BBC, Zoom and Other Major Websites Linked to iPhone Exploit Loaders https://www.infostealers.com/article/poisoned-scripts-on-bbc-zoom-and-other-major-websites-linked-to-iphone-exploit-loaders/

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_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
