---
id: "TECH-202611-gcnw7w"
page: "https://infrastack.ai/live/TECH-202611-gcnw7w"
kind: "technique"
aliases: []
title: "Someone with physical access to a stolen Windows laptop can brute-force its Windows Hello PIN or BitLocker PIN by rolling back the TPM's lockout counter (ACM CCS '26 paper)"
severity: "medium"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "vendor"
products: [{"name": "Windows Hello", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Microsoft"}, {"name": "BitLocker", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Microsoft"}, {"name": "AMD fTPM", "fixed": [], "vendor": "AMD"}, {"name": "Intel PTT", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Intel"}, {"name": "Microsoft Pluton", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Microsoft"}, {"name": "Winbond SPI flash", "fixed": [], "vendor": "Winbond"}]
ecosystems: []
tags: ["early-warning", "technique"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: null
first_seen_at: "2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-16T13:56:41+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "analyst", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00", "cites": ["https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126"]}, {"source": "analyst", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00", "cites": ["https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126"]}]
exploit_sources: []
---

# Someone with physical access to a stolen Windows laptop can brute-force its Windows Hello PIN or BitLocker PIN by rolling back the TPM's lockout counter (ACM CCS '26 paper)

Link for people: https://infrastack.ai/live/TECH-202611-gcnw7w (this .md is for agents)

Researchers (Werling, Seifert et al., arXiv 2611.18126, submitted 13 Nov 2026, revised from an ACM CCS '26 paper) show that the TPM anti-hammering lockout behind Windows Hello PINs and BitLocker TPM+PIN can be reset. The lockout state lives in SPI flash protected by Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC). Winbond SPI flash leaks its RPMC HMAC key under voltage glitching, and AMD's NV controller does not check RPMC increments, so cheap interposer hardware can roll back firmware TPM (fTPM) state. With that, a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN fell in 40 hours, and a default 6-digit BitLocker TPM+PIN drops from 19 years to 20 days in the worst case. A cracked PIN also exposes device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. Affected: fTPM implementations from AMD, Intel and Microsoft Pluton; AMD desktops without RPMC flash appear to have no rollback protection at all. The attack as published needs physical access to the device. Proof of concept only, no reports of attacks. Vendor response, fixes and CVE: unknown.

_Summary, check and fix written by a model from the sources; labelled as such._

## Affected

- :Windows Hello affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :BitLocker affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :AMD fTPM affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Intel PTT affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Microsoft Pluton affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed
- :Winbond SPI flash affected range not listed fixed no fixed version listed

## How to check

Exposed: Windows laptops and desktops that protect Windows Hello or BitLocker with a short PIN on a firmware TPM (AMD fTPM, Intel PTT, Microsoft Pluton), especially AMD machines and those with Winbond SPI flash. Lost or stolen devices are the ones at risk. Machines with a discrete TPM chip are not named in the paper. Check the TPM type with tpm.msc or Get-Tpm.

## Fix

No vendor fix is known yet. For lost or stolen devices, revoke their Windows Hello / Entra device keys and SSO sessions and rotate BitLocker recovery keys. Require longer, alphanumeric Windows Hello and BitLocker startup PINs through Intune or Group Policy, since a 4-6 digit PIN is now within reach of a brute force. Watch for AMD, Intel and Microsoft firmware advisories.

## Timeline

- 2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00 analyst https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126
- 2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00 analyst https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126 — Corrected summary: the paper does not say whether a remote variant exists

## Documents

- [describes] Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello Pins https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50517375
- [describes] Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs (arXiv:2611.18126, ACM CCS '26) https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126

---

_Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai_
