{"id":"TECH-202611-gcnw7w","kind":"technique","aliases":[],"related":[],"title":"Someone with physical access to a stolen Windows laptop can brute-force its Windows Hello PIN or BitLocker PIN by rolling back the TPM's lockout counter (ACM CCS '26 paper)","description":null,"summary":"Researchers (Werling, Seifert et al., arXiv 2611.18126, submitted 13 Nov 2026, revised from an ACM CCS '26 paper) show that the TPM anti-hammering lockout behind Windows Hello PINs and BitLocker TPM+PIN can be reset. The lockout state lives in SPI flash protected by Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMC). Winbond SPI flash leaks its RPMC HMAC key under voltage glitching, and AMD's NV controller does not check RPMC increments, so cheap interposer hardware can roll back firmware TPM (fTPM) state. With that, a 4-digit Windows Hello PIN fell in 40 hours, and a default 6-digit BitLocker TPM+PIN drops from 19 years to 20 days in the worst case. A cracked PIN also exposes device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. Affected: fTPM implementations from AMD, Intel and Microsoft Pluton; AMD desktops without RPMC flash appear to have no rollback protection at all. The attack as published needs physical access to the device. Proof of concept only, no reports of attacks. Vendor response, fixes and CVE: unknown.","severity":"medium","cvss":null,"epss":null,"exploited":false,"exploited_at":null,"products":[{"name":"Windows Hello","fixed":[],"vendor":"Microsoft"},{"name":"BitLocker","fixed":[],"vendor":"Microsoft"},{"name":"AMD fTPM","fixed":[],"vendor":"AMD"},{"name":"Intel PTT","fixed":[],"vendor":"Intel"},{"name":"Microsoft Pluton","fixed":[],"vendor":"Microsoft"},{"name":"Winbond SPI flash","fixed":[],"vendor":"Winbond"}],"ecosystems":[],"tags":["early-warning","technique"],"not_affected_if":[],"how_to_check":"Exposed: Windows laptops and desktops that protect Windows Hello or BitLocker with a short PIN on a firmware TPM (AMD fTPM, Intel PTT, Microsoft Pluton), especially AMD machines and those with Winbond SPI flash. Lost or stolen devices are the ones at risk. Machines with a discrete TPM chip are not named in the paper. Check the TPM type with tpm.msc or Get-Tpm.","fix":"No vendor fix is known yet. For lost or stolen devices, revoke their Windows Hello / Entra device keys and SSO sessions and rotate BitLocker recovery keys. Require longer, alphanumeric Windows Hello and BitLocker startup PINs through Intune or Group Policy, since a 4-6 digit PIN is now within reach of a brute force. Watch for AMD, Intel and Microsoft firmware advisories.","status":"open","published_at":null,"first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00","triaged_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00","updated_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:41+00:00","category":"vendor","confidence":null,"triage":null,"analyst_status":"done","analyst_note":null,"search":"'-202611':34A '13':60B '19':157B '20':160B '2026':62B '26':31A,68B '2611.18126':58B '4':138B '40':145B '6':150B 'access':4A,209B 'acm':29A,66B 'affect':181B 'al':56B 'also':169B 'amd':39A,115B,185B,190B 'anti':75B 'anti-hamm':74B 'appear':195B 'arxiv':57B 'attack':204B,220B 'back':23A,130B 'base':178B 'behind':78B 'bitlock':19A,83B,152B 'bitlocker':38A 'bound':173B 'brute':12A 'brute-forc':11A 'case':165B 'ccs':30A,67B 'cheap':125B 'check':121B 'concept':215B 'control':118B 'counter':28A,101B 'crack':167B 'cve':225B 'day':161B 'default':149B 'desktop':191B 'devic':172B,212B 'device-bound':171B 'digit':139B,151B 'drop':155B 'earli':49B 'early-warn':48B 'enterpris':179B 'et':55B 'expos':170B 'fell':143B 'firmwar':131B 'fix':223B 'flash':47A,95B,105B,194B 'forc':13A 'ftpm':40A,133B,182B 'gcnw7w':35A 'glitch':113B 'hammer':76B 'hardwar':127B 'hello':16A,37A,80B,141B,177B 'hello-bas':176B 'hmac':109B 'hour':146B 'implement':183B 'increment':123B 'intel':41A,186B 'interpos':126B 'key':110B,174B 'laptop':9A 'leak':106B 'live':92B 'lockout':27A,77B,90B 'microsoft':43A,188B 'monoton':100B 'need':207B 'nov':61B 'nv':117B 'paper':32A,69B 'physic':3A,208B 'pin':17A,20A,81B,85B,142B,154B,168B 'pluton':44A,189B 'proof':213B 'protect':96B,99B,200B 'ptt':42A 'publish':206B 'replay':98B 'report':218B 'research':52B 'reset':88B 'respons':222B 'revis':63B 'roll':22A,129B 'rollback':199B 'rpmc':102B,108B,122B,193B 'seifert':54B 'show':70B 'someon':1A 'spi':46A,94B,104B 'sso':180B 'state':91B,134B 'stolen':7A 'submit':59B 'tech':33A 'techniqu':51B 'tpm':25A,73B,84B,132B,153B 'unknown':226B 'vendor':221B 'voltag':112B 'warn':50B 'werl':53B 'winbond':45A,103B 'window':8A,15A,79B,140B 'windows':36A 'without':192B 'worst':164B 'year':158B","nicknames":[],"mitigations":[],"who_affected":null,"tier":"C","verified":{},"analyst_revisit_at":null,"fix_status":"unknown","audience":null,"plain_action":null,"pkeys":["amdftpm","bitlocker","ftpm","hello","intelptt","microsoftpluton","pluton","ptt","spiflash","winbondspiflash","windowshello"],"ptokens":["amd","bitlocker","flash","ftpm","hello","intel","microsoft","pluton","ptt","spi","winbond","windows"],"labels":["earlywarning","medium","technique","vendor"],"campaign_type":"exploitation","search_a":"'-202611':34A '26':31A 'access':4A 'acm':29A 'amd':39A 'back':23A 'bitlock':19A 'bitlocker':38A 'brute':12A 'brute-forc':11A 'ccs':30A 'counter':28A 'flash':47A 'forc':13A 'ftpm':40A 'gcnw7w':35A 'hello':16A,37A 'intel':41A 'laptop':9A 'lockout':27A 'microsoft':43A 'paper':32A 'physic':3A 'pin':17A,20A 'pluton':44A 'ptt':42A 'roll':22A 'someon':1A 'spi':46A 'stolen':7A 'tech':33A 'tpm':25A 'winbond':45A 'window':8A,15A 'windows':36A","search_b":"'13':60B '19':157B '20':160B '2026':62B '26':68B '2611.18126':58B '4':138B '40':145B '6':150B 'access':209B 'acm':66B 'affect':181B 'al':56B 'also':169B 'amd':115B,185B,190B 'anti':75B 'anti-hamm':74B 'appear':195B 'arxiv':57B 'attack':204B,220B 'back':130B 'base':178B 'behind':78B 'bitlock':83B,152B 'bound':173B 'case':165B 'ccs':67B 'cheap':125B 'check':121B 'concept':215B 'control':118B 'counter':101B 'crack':167B 'cve':225B 'day':161B 'default':149B 'desktop':191B 'devic':172B,212B 'device-bound':171B 'digit':139B,151B 'drop':155B 'earli':49B 'early-warn':48B 'enterpris':179B 'et':55B 'expos':170B 'fell':143B 'firmwar':131B 'fix':223B 'flash':95B,105B,194B 'ftpm':133B,182B 'glitch':113B 'hammer':76B 'hardwar':127B 'hello':80B,141B,177B 'hello-bas':176B 'hmac':109B 'hour':146B 'implement':183B 'increment':123B 'intel':186B 'interpos':126B 'key':110B,174B 'leak':106B 'live':92B 'lockout':77B,90B 'microsoft':188B 'monoton':100B 'need':207B 'nov':61B 'nv':117B 'paper':69B 'physic':208B 'pin':81B,85B,142B,154B,168B 'pluton':189B 'proof':213B 'protect':96B,99B,200B 'publish':206B 'replay':98B 'report':218B 'research':52B 'reset':88B 'respons':222B 'revis':63B 'roll':129B 'rollback':199B 'rpmc':102B,108B,122B,193B 'seifert':54B 'show':70B 'spi':94B,104B 'sso':180B 'state':91B,134B 'submit':59B 'techniqu':51B 'tpm':73B,84B,132B,153B 'unknown':226B 'vendor':221B 'voltag':112B 'warn':50B 'werl':53B 'winbond':103B 'window':79B,140B 'without':192B 'worst':164B 'year':158B","search_c":"","cause_entry":null,"cause_path":null,"disclosures_checked_at":null,"first_public_at":"2026-11-13T00:00:00+00:00","kev":null,"cvss_vector":null,"cvss_by":null,"poc_count":0,"sources":[{"source":"analyst","external_id":"TECH-202611-gcnw7w","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126","severity":null,"published_at":null,"modified_at":null,"first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:28+00:00","note":null,"cites":["https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126"]},{"source":"analyst","external_id":"TECH-202611-gcnw7w:4122","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126","severity":null,"published_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00","modified_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00","first_seen_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00","fetched_at":"2026-11-16T13:56:39+00:00","note":"Corrected summary: the paper does not say whether a remote variant exists","cites":["https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126"]}],"documents":[{"id":169683,"url":"https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50517375","title":"Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello Pins","kind":"post","source":"hackernews","publisher":null,"text":"Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello Pins\nhttps://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126\n\n2 points, 0 comments on Hacker News","published_at":"2026-11-16T13:25:17+00:00","relation":"describes","confidence":null,"note":null},{"id":169821,"url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.18126","title":"Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs (arXiv:2611.18126, ACM CCS '26)","kind":"blog","source":"analyst","publisher":null,"text":"Werling, Finder, Jacob, Prein, Kühnapfel, Seifert. Windows Hello PIN lockout (TPM anti-hammering) state stored in SPI flash protected by RPMC. Flaws: Winbond SPI flash leaks its RPMC HMAC key under voltage glitching (counter can be forged); AMD NV controller does not verify RPMC increments, so an interposer can suppress them. Rolling back fTPM state resets lockout counters, allowing brute force: 4-digit Windows Hello PIN found in 40 hours (vs ~69 days); default 6-digit BitLocker TPM+PIN worst case from 19 years to 20 days. Compromised PIN exposes device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO. Requires physical access, low-cost interposer hardware; tested on locked, encrypted devices. Affects fTPM implementations from AMD, Intel and Microsoft Pluton; AMD desktops without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection. Vendor notification, fixes, CVE not stated.","published_at":"2026-11-13T00:00:00+00:00","relation":"describes","confidence":null,"note":null}],"disclosures":[],"exploit_sources":[],"notice":"Free to read, with fair use of about 60 pages a minute. For higher limits or API access: sales@infrastack.ai"}