Live › technique › TECH-202610-xml-signature-wrapping-lets-attackers-bypass-login-in-apps-u
Go to dashboardEgov.Integrations.MPass.Saml is the ASP.NET Core handler that relying-party apps use to check SAML 2.0 responses from Moldova's MPass government login. Every version before 10.0.4 checks the signature with SignedXml.CheckSignature(publicCertificate, verifySignatureOnly: true). That call only confirms that the references in SignedInfo are validly signed. It does not tie the signed element to the assertion the app then reads. As a result, an attacker can wrap a validly signed response around a forged assertion (XML Signature Wrapping) and log in as another user. Anyone running an ASP.NET Core app that accepts MPass logins through this package is at risk. A researcher disclosed it on r/netsec on 2026-10-29 with code-level detail. A CVE has been requested (CAN-2026-2041077) and the fix is in 10.0.4. No attacks have been reported; exploitation in the wild is unknown.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 01:20 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Egov.Integrations.MPass.Saml | nuget | <10.0.4 | 10.0.4 |
| MPass (Moldova e-government SSO) | – | – | – |
10.0.4 in .csproj, Directory.Packages.props or packages.lock.json10.0.4Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
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