Live › technique › TECH-202610-java-s-blocked-certs-fix-for-the-compromised-emudhra-cas-can
Go to dashboardSeveral eMudhra intermediate CA keys were compromised on 2026-10-20. Java's mitigation adds those intermediates' SHA-256 fingerprints to blocked.certs. Sonatype Research (2026-10-21) showed that an intermediate can be re-encoded without its private key (ECDSA: swap signature s for n-s; RSA: drop the NULL parameter from the outer signature algorithm). The new encoding has a different fingerprint, is not matched by blocked.certs, and still validates in the JDK configurations they tested. So a Java service or client that relies only on blocked.certs may still trust TLS chains through the compromised eMudhra intermediates if an attacker can intercept its traffic. The JDK versions tested are not named. No exploitation reported so far. The same exact-fingerprint weakness may apply to other runtimes or tools that block by fingerprint (unverified).
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-26 23:27 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Java | maven | unknown (JDK versions using blocked.certs fingerprint mitigation for eMudhra) | – |
| OpenJDK | – | unknown | – |
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
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