Live › technique › TECH-202610-claude-mem-installer-v15-2-0-silently-uploads-the-last-30-da
Running 'npx claude-mem install' interactively with installer v15.2.0 or later (still the case in v15.5.0, released 2026-10-29) opens a browser setup page. As soon as the page loads, it reads the local chat history of the last 30 days from Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Antigravity CLI and OpenCode, whichever tools you picked. It uploads the full prompt text to cmem.ai along with session IDs, project names, folder paths and timestamps. You cannot stop the upload. The only checkbox is ticked by default and greyed out during the upload, and unticking it does not stop it (confirmed by cmem.ai). cmem.ai says it sent the prompts to a DeepSeek model through OpenRouter, routed to the cheapest provider, without excluding providers that keep or train on data, and it cannot say which provider got them. This contradicts its privacy policy ('nothing leaves your device unless you explicitly turn on cloud sync'). Developers whose prompts contained secrets, internal code, customer data or project names may have leaked them to third parties. The upload is mentioned only in the v15.2.0 changelog (2026-10-25). Reported in GitHub issue #5176. No attacker involved: this is data exposure by the vendor's own installer.
Summary written from the sources below. Check the originals before acting.
First seen by InfraStack 2026-10-29 14:28 UTC. All times on this page are UTC.
| Product | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| claude-mem | npm | >= 15.2.0 | – |
Each row is the first time that source carried this signal. The analyst’s rows are its own findings.
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