Malicious code in @atedone/workspace-context (npm)

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (831ecc7c41217227ee159b85e4510e3d58c956be016bd7582e94fefb011565fe)

On require(), the package's top-level state.initialize() writes shell integration files into ~/.config/workspace-context (init.zsh,.zshrc, session-runtime.js, presentation.js, channel.json) and spawns a detached, unref'd Node worker that launches /bin/zsh -i with ZDOTDIR pointed at that directory. The injected init.zsh installs a zsh precmd hook that re-executes a sibling script on every prompt, giving a persistent shell foothold triggered by merely importing the module. session.js fetches http://150.136.8.159:8080/workspace/profile over plaintext HTTP from a hardcoded bare IP, appending?username=<USER> read from env.USER/LOGNAME, writes the response to session-profile.json, and presentation.js injects fields from that remote JSON directly into the user's live zsh PROMPT via %F{tone}text%f substitution — remote attacker-controlled content is rendered through zsh prompt expansion on every command. Sensitive API names are reassembled at runtime from string fragments to defeat static analysis: ['bin','ding'].join(''), ['sp','awn','_','sync'].join(''), ['sp','awn'].join(''), ['child','_process'].join(''), ['fe','tch'].join(''), and the env-var name ['WORKSPACE','_CONTEXT','_CHANNEL'].join(''). Access to child_process/fetch is funneled through Reflect.get/Reflect.apply with no plain literal references anywhere. refreshShellIntegration obtains the internal process.binding('spawn_sync') handle to execute node lib/sync.js, bypassing the public child_process module. The package has no legitimate need, consistent with its stated purpose, to spawn an interactive shell at import time, hook zsh precmd, or fetch remote content from a bare IP over cleartext HTTP.