---
id: "MAL-2026-18440"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-18440"]
title: "Malicious code in @axo_cuy/baileys (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "@axo_cuy/baileys", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 1.0.0", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-11-02T01:45:17+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-11-02T03:31:19+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-11-02T03:33:51+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18440", "first_seen_at": "2026-11-02T03:31:19+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in @axo_cuy/baileys (npm)

## Affected

- npm:@axo_cuy/baileys affected = 1.0.0 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-11-02T03:31:19+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18440

## From the sources

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (0b32f937714cfd8023a0123f7e15dbeb6a2146fd7f3a22f9cb5ff6728b9d3f48)
package.json declares a hard dependency `libsignal` with the source `github:tenka-san/libsignal-node`. This is an off-registry dependency source: `npm install` resolves it to the current HEAD of that third-party GitHub repository with no version/commit pin and no integrity check, and executes any lifecycle scripts shipped by that repository on the installer's machine. The owner of `tenka-san/libsignal-node` can change the installed code at any time without republishing this package. The target repository is not the upstream Baileys/libsignal publisher, so installation introduces a third-party code path that bypasses registry review and dependency pinning.

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