---
id: "MAL-2026-18320"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-18320"]
title: "Malicious code in @walknpm/todo-cli (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "@walknpm/todo-cli", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 2.0.1", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-26T00:55:57+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:53+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:05:48+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18320", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:53+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in @walknpm/todo-cli (npm)

## Affected

- npm:@walknpm/todo-cli affected = 2.0.1 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:53+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18320

## From the sources

@walknpm/todo-cli@2.0.1 is a new release of a todo-list CLI and web app whose only change from 2.0.0 is a postinstall script, `sh scripts/miner.sh`, that runs on npm install. The script downloads a gzip carrier from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com to /tmp/.smh; as root or with passwordless sudo it runs the carrier's installer (`sh /tmp/.smi agent`), which installs an XMRig miner plus two helper daemons under random system-component names and persists them as systemd units or @reboot cron entries, and otherwise it extracts the bundled XMRig binary to ~/.local/lib/<random name>/ and mines Monero to networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 over TLS with a hardcoded wallet. The npm account walknpm published the same scripts/miner.sh in dsh-plugin-blender-3d@0.2.1 within 27 seconds of this version on 2026-10-26, and it is byte-identical to the one in @sudobility/testomniac_client (MAL-2026-18129).

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (f32e42bc70458d6a0973dfbe2d94961cca2ee423198c53bf753a7680c61df96f)
The package's `postinstall` hook runs `scripts/miner.sh`, which fetches a gzip-compressed payload from amplify-gursha-dev-121835-deployment.s3.amazonaws.com (using a hardcoded AWS access key <redacted> in a presigned URL), writes it to `/tmp/.smi`, and executes it via `sh` on every `npm install`. If root or passwordless sudo is available, the script runs `sh /tmp/.smi agent` to install a persistent agent (cron/relay/tor per in-script comments). Otherwise, it extracts an embedded XMRig binary (base64/tar.gz blob after a `__PAYLOAD__` marker), writes a Monero pool configuration to `$HOME/.sysmond.json` pointing at networkservicesupp.flashhub.net:8443 with wallet 49u1mKb1dNoMixgRHt11Ra32D1w4hviUuRDbaJhXFwXUjQP4FiHsSjnDa7XZepDUW1Tx6HhR6gFwWgbuwNxby4UAMiqxieX, copies the miner to `$HOME/.local/lib/<stealth-name>/<stealth-name>` using a system-daemon-like name pool (`edid-mon`, `smmon`, `irqstatsd`,...), and backgrounds it with `nohup`. Installing the package results in unconditional remote code execution on the installer's host, cryptomining compute/electricity theft, and persistence that is non-trivial to detect and remove.

## Source: ossf-package-analysis (8c741f8bd0012bceb8789b8e2fc0ac836c5ccb88a348918365af4850f1576be4)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@walknpm/todo-cli' @ 2.0.1 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

- The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.

---

_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_