---
id: "MAL-2026-18278"
kind: "package"
aliases: ["MAL-2026-18278"]
title: "Malicious code in @factoryz/apollo (npm)"
severity: "critical"
cvss: null
epss: null
exploited: false
status: "open"
category: "package"
products: [{"name": "@factoryz/apollo", "fixed": [], "affected": "= 99.9.1", "ecosystem": "npm"}]
ecosystems: ["npm"]
tags: ["malicious", "package"]
not_affected_if: []
published_at: "2026-10-25T15:05:42+00:00"
first_seen_at: "2026-10-26T20:51:52+00:00"
updated_at: "2026-10-26T21:05:48+00:00"
sources: [{"source": "osv-malicious", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18278", "first_seen_at": "2026-10-26T20:51:52+00:00"}]
---

# Malicious code in @factoryz/apollo (npm)

## Affected

- npm:@factoryz/apollo affected = 99.9.1 fixed ?

## Timeline

- 2026-10-26T20:51:52+00:00 osv-malicious https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18278

## From the sources

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (5adaa62818c76a10cbf0b536a6854633e24a73028c803fc597c5b5ec1d78b8ad)
The package ships only an empty stub (`module.exports = {}`) and a manifest whose sole dependency `ltidisafe` is resolved from a hardcoded off-registry HTTPS URL (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.8.7.tgz`) rather than a registry version range. `npm install @factoryz/apollo` fetches whatever bytes that URL returns and installs them, executing any lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall) contained in the fetched tarball. There is no version pin, no integrity (`sshasum`) check, and no publisher binding — the host controller can swap the tarball contents at any time. The version number `99.9.1` is implausibly high for a package whose shipped code is a one-line stub, consistent with a dependency-confusion / resolution-winning shape. The lure package itself contains no other logic; the manifest IS the payload.

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_Free to read at a human pace. An API with keys and an MCP server are in preparation; early access: hello@infrastack.ai_
